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Abstract
Multimodal Approach for Malware Detection
Jarilyn Marie Herna´ndez Jime´nez
Although malware detection is a very active area of research, few works were
focused on using physical properties (e.g., power consumption) and multimodal
features for malware detection. We designed an experimental testbed that allowed
us to run samples of malware and non-malicious software applications and to col-
lect power consumption, network traffic, and system logs data, and subsequently
to extract dynamic behavioral-based features. We also extracted code-based static
features of both malware and non-malicious software applications. These features
were used for malware detection based on: feature level fusion using power con-
sumption and network traffic data, feature level fusion using network traffic data
and system logs, and multimodal feature level and decision level fusion.
The contributions when using feature level fusion of power consumption and
network traffic data are: (1) We focused on detecting real malware using the ex-
tracted dynamic behavioral features (both power-based and network traffic-based)
and supervised machine learning algorithms, which has not been done by any of
the prior works. (2) We ran a large number of machine learning experiments,
which allowed us to identify the best performing learner, DC voltage rails that led
to the best malware detection performance, and the subset of features that are the
best predictors for malware detection. (3) The comparison of malware detection
performance was done using a comprehensive set of metrics that reflect different
aspects of the quality of malware detection.
In the case of the feature level fusion using network traffic data and system
logs, the contributions are: (1) Most of the previous works that have used network
flows-based features have done classification of the network traffic, while our focus
was on classifying the software running in a machine as malware and non-malicious
software using the extracted dynamic behavioral features. (2) We experimented
with different sizes of the training set (i.e., 90%, 75%, 50%, and 25% of the data)
and found that smaller training sets produced very good classification results. This
aspect of our work has a practical value because the manual labeling of the training
set is a tedious and time consuming process.
In this dissertation we present a multimodal deep learning neural network that
integrates different modalities (i.e., power consumption, system logs, network traf-
fic, and code-based static data) using decision level fusion. We evaluated the
performance of each modality individually, when using feature level fusion, and
when using decision level fusion. The contributions of our multimodal approach
are as follow: (1) Collecting data from different modalities allowed us to develop a
multimodal approach to malware detection, which has not been widely explored by
prior works. Even more, none of the previous works compared the performance of
feature level fusion with decision level fusion, which is explored in this dissertation.
(2) We proposed a multimodal decision level fusion malware detection approach
using a deep neural network and compared its performance with the performance of
feature level fusion approaches based on deep neural network and standard super-
vised machine learning algorithms (i.e., Random Forest, J48, JRip, PART, Naive
Bayes, and SMO).
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background & Motivation
Malware is a malicious software that is developed and propagated by cyber crimi-
nals to launch a wide range of security attacks, such as stealing confidential data,
hijacking devices remotely to deliver massive spam emails, launching denial of
service attacks, identity theft, and so on [254]. A recent study [235] showed the
average time to resolve a malicious attack is fifty days and the average time to
resolve a ransomware attack is twenty three days. Moreover, the financial con-
sequences of cyber-attacks are worsening [235]. In order to protect the computer
systems against the evolving threat malware poses, malware detection is imperative
to both anti-malware industry and users.
Typically, malware uses polymorphic techniques to avoid detection. Polymor-
phic malware can bypass current detection methods by slightly changing the in-
structions of an existing malware sample. These new malware instances are called
variants. Although these variants appear to be different programs from the view-
point of anti-virus (AV) software, they exhibit similar functionality to their prede-
cessor. Consequently, these new malware variants can bypass traditional detection
methods until a pattern-matching for them can be identified and incorporated into
the detection system.
Today anti-malware industry uses data mining techniques to detect malware.
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These techniques include two stages: feature extraction and classification. For
data collection and feature extraction, there are two methods used in the malware
detection research area: static and dynamic [300]. The static methods extract
features based on the analysis of the binary code of malware examples without
executing the malware. On the other side, dynamic methods require the execu-
tion of a given malware example, typically in a sandbox environment [305, 275],
and extract behavior-based features that represent the actions performed by the
malicious software.
Both static (code-based) and dynamic (behavioral-based) feature extraction
methods have their own advantages and disadvantages. Static methods contains
very useful information from the binary code and are easy to extract, but they
are prone to obfuscation techniques, which are commonly used by polymorphic
malware [270], and attacks based on packer-based encryption [116]. In the case of
dynamic methods, the main advantage is that they reflect the runtime behavior of
a program which is hard to obfuscate [286, 65], but the data collection process is
time and resource consuming [283, 143].
With respect to malware detection, nowadays it is typically conducted via the
implementation of machine learning methods. The basic idea behind machine
learning is to train a model based on a specific algorithm to perform the classifi-
cation (i.e., classify between malware and non-malicious software). The training
of the algorithm is done based on the input dataset, and the model that is built is
subsequently used to make classifications. The performance of malware detection
approaches depends critically on both the extracted features and the classification
techniques.
Considering the limitations of static and dynamic methods, in this dissertation
we explore the effectiveness of using different modalities for malware detection.
Our dataset was created by using features from multiple sources (i.e., code-based
static data, power consumption, system logs, and network traffic data). Each of
these sources is called a modality [79].
To collect the static data we used the PE Explorer software tool [51] and to
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collect the dynamic behavioral data we used our testbed [171]. The power con-
sumption, system logs, and network traffic data were collected while the malware
and non-malicious applications ran separately, in a controlled sandbox environ-
ment, on the experimental machine. Thus, based on the place of analysis our
approach belongs to the commonly used remote server/cloud detection approach
(e.g., [305, 275, 300]). Power data was collected by using a Data Acquisition Sys-
tem (DAQ) which measured the power consumption from four different voltage
rails (+3.3V, +5V, +12V on the motherboard, and +12V CPU rails). System logs
were collected using CaptureBAT [32] and the network traffic data was collected
using Wireshark [42].
For our experiments we selected examples of recent malware with different
traits, such as viruses, worms, trojans, backdoors, rootkits, and ransomware. In
the case of the non-malicious software, we used some applications that are network
intensive and other that are CPU and memory usage intensive. Compared to
datasets from previous works [91, 201] which included power-based features for
malware detection, our dataset is the largest. Bridges et al. [91] used five malware
examples and Luckett et al. [201] used four malware examples, while here we are
using fifty one malware examples and twenty two non-malicious applications.
With respect to the classification stage of malware detection, we used the su-
pervised machine learning approach. To classify any unknown file, which could
be malicious or non-malicious, the classification process has two steps: model
construction (i.e., training) and model usage (i.e., testing). In the training step,
samples of labeled (i.e., known) malware and non-malicious software are provided
to the system and the feature vectors are extracted. Both the feature vectors and
the class label (i.e., malicious or non-malicious) are used to build a classification
model (or a classifier). During the model usage phase (i.e., testing), the classifier
generated in the training phase is used to classify a new collection of previously
not seen applications, which could be either malicious or non-malicious.
When multiple sources are integrated to perform an analysis the task is referred
to as multimodal fusion [74]. Two levels of multimodal fusion exist: feature level
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and decision level. Feature level (also known as early fusion) is the most widely
used approach as it fuses all the extracted features into one feature vector, while
decision level fusion (also known as late fusion) fuses multiple modalities in the
semantic space [74].
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
• We developed a testbed [171], which was used to collect power consump-
tion, network traffic data, and system logs when running samples of malware
and non-malicious software applications. Power data was collected by using
a Data Acquisition System (DAQ) which measured the power consumption
from four different voltage rails, while the system logs were collected using
CaptureBAT [32], and the network traffic data was collected using Wire-
shark [42].
• In addition to dynamic behavioral-based features (i.e., power-based features,
network traffic-based features, and system logs-based features) we extracted
code-based static features (i.e., headers-based, data directories-based, and
DLL dependencies-based features), which are typically used for malware de-
tection.
• With respect to power consumption-based features, we identified the best
performing DC voltage rails that led to the best malware detection per-
formance. Our dataset is the largest when we compared it to prior
works [91, 201] that used power-based features for malware detection.
• Most of the previous works that have used network flows-based fea-
tures [124, 120, 98, 61, 316, 73, 289, 117, 125, 84, 308, 204, 148, 149] have done
classification of the network traffic, while in this dissertation we focused on
classifying the software running in a machine as malware and non-malicious
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software using the extracted code-based static and dynamic behavioral-based
features.
• We explored feature selection using information gain and identified the small-
est number of features sufficient to distinguish malware from non-malicious
software [156, 171]. We also experimented with different sizes of the train-
ing set (i.e., 90%, 75%, 50%, and 25% of the data) and found that smaller
training sets produced very good classification results [171]. This aspect of
our work has a practical value because the manual labeling of the training
set is a tedious and time consuming process.
• Collecting data from different sources allows us to develop a multimodal ap-
proach to malware detection, which has not been widely explored by the
prior works. Exceptions are [193, 184]. Kumar et al. [193] used two modal-
ities and Kim [184] divided the code-based static features into 7 feature
vectors, and used each of them as an individual modality. Both of the prior
works [193, 184] monitored mobile devices, while here we monitored a general-
purpose computer. None of these works compared the performance of feature
level with decision level fusion, which is explored in this dissertation.
• We proposed a multimodal decision level fusion malware detection approach
using a deep neural network. We compared its performance with the perfor-
mance of feature level fusion approaches based on deep neural network and
standard supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e., Random Forest, J48,
JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO). Kim et al. [184] used only code-based
static features, while we are combining behavioral-based with code-based
static features.
1.3 Main Findings
We first experimented with power consumption and network traffic data and used
ten supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e., J48, Random Forest, Random
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Tree, OneR, Naive Bayes, JRip, PART, Multilayer Perceptron, SMO, and Decision
Table) for classification. The main findings include: (1) Among the best performing
learners, Random Forest had the highest F-score and close to the highest G-score.
(2) Power data extracted from the +12V CPU rails led to better performance than
power data from the other three voltage rails. (3) Using only power-based features
provided better performance than using only network traffic-based features; using
both types of features had the best performance. (4) Feature selection based on
information gain was used to identify the smallest numbers of features sufficient
to successfully distinguish malware from non-malicious software. The top eleven
features provided the same performance as using all 25 features. Five out of seven
power-based features were among the top eleven features.
We also experimented with network traffic data and system logs by evaluat-
ing four supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e., J48, Naive Bayes, Random
Forest, and PART) for malware detection and identified the best learner. Further-
more, we used feature selection on information gain to identify the smallest number
of features needed for classification and experimented with different training sets
of different sizes. The main findings include: (1) Adding network flows-based fea-
tures improved significantly the performance of malware detection. (2) J48 and
PART were the best performing learners, with the highest F-score and G-score
values. (3) Using J48, the top five features ranked by information gain attained
the same performance as when using all 88 features. In the case of PART, the top
fourteen features ranked by information gain led to the same performance as when
all 88 features were used. None of the system logs-based features were included in
these two models. (4) The classification performance when training on 75% of the
data was comparable to training on 90% of the data. As little as 25% of the data
can be used for training at an expense of somewhat higher, but not very signifi-
cant performance degradation (i.e., less than 7% for F-score and 6% for G-score
compared to when 90% of the data were used for training).
In addition, we explored the effectiveness of integrating all four modalities (i.e.,
power consumption, network traffic data, system logs, and code-based static data)
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for malware detection by using a deep learning neural network. To evaluate the
performance of our multimodal approach, we conducted various experiments. We
compared the performance of our multimodal fusion approach with each modality
individually and to other learners (i.e., Random Forest, J48, JRip, PART, Na¨ıve
Bayes, and SMO) when using feature level fusion. Furthermore, we compared
the performance of our deep learning neural network when using feature level and
decision level fusion. The main findings include: (1) When using multimodal
feature level fusion, the performance of the deep neural network was worse than
Random Forest, J48, JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO. (2) Using deep learning
neural network for multimodal decision level fusion outperformed these standard
supervised machine learning algorithms.
1.4 Dissertation Overview
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a detailed
background on malware. Chapter 3 presents a literature review on existing malware
detection methods that used similar code-based static and dynamic behavioral-
based features, and includes the state of the art with respect to multimodal fusion.
Chapter 4 describes the preliminary experimental set-up and presents a proof of
concept study that shows the feasibility of our testbed. Chapter 5 explains the
modifications done in the experimental set-up to collect simultaneously data from
multiple modalities and explains the malicious and non-malicious software selec-
tion. Chapter 6 explains the data pre-processing and feature extraction process.
A description of the used supervised machine learning experiments and perfor-
mance metrics is given in Chapter 7. The conducted machine learning experiments
when combining the power-based and network traffic-based features is described in
Chapter 8, while the experiments when combining network traffic-based and sys-
tem logs-based features is given in Chapter 9. Our multimodal malware detection
approach and results are described in Chapter 10. Threats to validity are given in
Chapter 11. The conclusion and future work are presented in Chapter 12.
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Background on Malware
This chapter defines what is malware, describes the common malware types,
explains why cyber criminals use malware, and provides several examples of cyber-
attacks that were caused by malware.
2.1 What is Malware?
The term malware is a combination of the words mal icious and software. Mali-
cious software is any software that is used to disrupt the operations of a machine,
to gather sensitive data, or gain access to private computer systems [50, 254].
Malware is created by cyber criminals with the objective of achieving particular
goals. These goals can include stealing confidential data, harvesting logins and
passwords, sending spam emails, launching denial of service attacks (DoS), and
extortion or identity theft [254]. An example is the malware called CryptoLocker,
which has been and is still used by cyber criminals to infect and encrypt all the
files on the computer, so that they can later ask for a ransom in order to decrypt
these files [34].
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2.2 Common Malware Types
Malware can fall into many different categories, depending on the method of trans-
mission, its mechanism of operation and what actions are taken once it gains a
foothold [179]. Most common malware types are: viruses, worms, trojans, back-
doors, rootkits, and ransomware. A computer virus is a piece of code that typically
needs human action to spread itself into one or more files and then performs some
action [87].
A worm is a program that copies itself from one computer to another [87]. The
difference between a virus and a worm is that a worm spreads on its own through
the network, that is, a worm does not need human action to spread [41]. Most
of the time, worms cause at least some harm to the system network while viruses
typically corrupt or modify files on a targeted computer [45].
A trojan horse is a malicious computer program which has a hidden function-
ality and typically misrepresents itself as useful, routine, or interesting in order to
persuade a victim to install it [53]. A difference between a virus, a worm, and a
trojan is that trojans do not attempt to inject themselves into other files or oth-
erwise propagate themselves [1]. Typically, backdoors are left after using a trojan
or a worm. As the name implies, backdoors, open a “backdoor” into a computer
with the objective of leaving a network connection for the cyber criminal or other
malware to enter the system or to spread spam [36]. In other words, a backdoor is
a type of malware that consists of a method for bypassing normal authentication
or encryption in a computer system [44, 31]. Furthermore, many trojan’s payload
act as a backdoor by contacting a controller which can then have unauthorized
access to the affected system [53]. In the context of malware, a payload refers to
the portion of the malware which performs the malicious action(s) [39].
A well-known malware type are rootkits. Rootkits are a “kit” consisting of
small and useful programs that allow an attacker to escalate to maximum priv-
ileges [159]. Rootkits are designed to hide the existence of certain processes or
programs from normal methods of detection and enable continued privileged ac-
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cess to a computer [206]. Typically, a rootkit has three goals: run, hide, and
act [274]. Rootkits run other malware on the target machine without restrictions
to avoid detection by an anti-virus (AV) or other security tools, and to get infor-
mation (e.g., user’s passwords) from the compromised computer. They work by
using a basic concept called modification. Essentially, a rootkit locates and modi-
fies the software with the purpose of changing the software behavior. An example
of a type of modification that can be made by a rootkit is patching, which is a
technique that modifies the data bytes encoded in a executable code [159].
While a rootkit hides from detection, a ransomware (also known as crypto-virus,
crypto-trojan or crypto-worm) threatens to publish the victim’s data or perpetually
block access to it unless a ransom is paid. Ransomware attacks are often carried out
by using trojans [53]. Typically, a ransomware encrypts all the files of the victim’s
system and then demands a ransom payment in return for the decryption key which
is required to decrypt the encrypted files [59]. Most of the time they are installed in
the system through a malicious email attachment, an infected software download,
or by visiting a malicious website or Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Once the
system is infected with ransomware, the user’s files are encrypted, and/or the
user is restricted from accessing the computer’s main features. Some ransomware-
based applications disguise themselves as an authority figure (e.g., a police or a
government agency such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Department
of Defense) claiming that the user’s system was locked down for security reasons
and that a ransom or a fee is required to reactivate it [280]. The ransom message
usually includes instructions on how to pay the ransom (most of the time is either
through credit card or bitcoins). Ransom amounts range from one hundred dollars
to several thousand dollars [281]. Figure 2.1 shows the message that appeared
after we executed the Locky [49] ransomware on the experimental machine.
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Figure 2.1: System message after infecting the experimental machine with the
Locky ransomware
2.3 Why Cyber Criminals use Malware?
There are many ways in which cyber criminals use malware. For instance, mal-
ware authors are increasingly taking advantage of the trust that exists between
users and software providers to inject malware on these updates, thus potentially
infecting the users through trusted official software distribution channels. A report
by FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence stated that at least there were five cases in which
malware authors compromised software providers [136].
Rootkits and ransomware are preferred among cyber criminals because of their
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effectiveness in achieving their goal (e.g., gaining access to the system) and be-
cause, at least in the case of rootkits, they can hide to avoid detection by using
modification techniques that are hard to detect. Most of the time cyber criminals
installed the rootkits once they have obtained root or administrative access to the
system. Obtaining root or administrative access to a system is a result of a di-
rect attack on the system. An example of direct attack is when a cyber criminal
gains full control over a system by exploiting a known vulnerability or a password.
Full control over a system means that existing software can be modified, including
software that might be used to detect malware.
In the case of a ransomware, cyber criminals use them as a convenient payment
system because it is hard to trace. Hence, they use them to commit financial fraud
and extort money from computer users. However, not every type of ransomware
will demand a cryptocurrency (digital currency that uses encryption techniques
such as bitcoins) payment. For example, some types of ransomware demand a gift
card code or other anonymous online payment option [94]. Examples of the most
common payments methods for ransomware are wire transfers, premium-rate text
messages, pre-paid voucher services (e.g. Paysafecard), and bitcoins [40].
Overall, cyber criminals use malware to steal passwords or network bandwidth,
or to install other malicious software [274], and to gain and maintain unauthorized
access to a system. By gaining unauthorized access to a system, the cyber crim-
inals can obtain privileges to access sensitive data and conceal its own existence.
Furthermore, a cyber criminal could use any type of malware that has rootkit ca-
pabilities to hide other malware types. Malware hidden by rootkits often monitor,
filter, and steal data, or could abuse the computer’s resources [27].
2.4 Cyber-attacks Caused by Malware
A cyber-attack refers to any act or attempt, successful or unsuccessful, to gain
unauthorized access to, disrupt or misuse a Licensee’s electronic systems or infor-
mation stored on such systems [12]. Not all cyber-attacks are caused by malware,
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they could also be caused by exploits (a vulnerability in the system) or by other
types of attacks such as a DoS (a type of attack in which the cyber criminal
seeks to make a machine or a network resource unavailable to its intended users
by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host that is connected to
the Internet). However, in this section we focus on those cyber-attacks that were
caused only by malware.
A well-known cyber-attack caused by malware is Stuxnet. Stuxnet is a worm
with rootkit capabilities that was first uncovered in 2010 [282]. Stuxnet has three
modules: a worm that executes all routines related to the main payload of the at-
tack; a link file that automatically executes the propagated copies of the worm; and
a rootkit component responsible for hiding all malicious files and processes [285].
It was introduced to the target environment via an infected USB flash drive. Once
the machine was infected, the malware spread across the network scanning for
Siemens Step-7 software on computers controlling a Programmable Logic Con-
troller (PLC) [282]. This worm subverts the Step-7 software application that was
used to reprogram these devices. This worm collected information on industrial
control systems (ICS) and caused the fast-spinning centrifuges to tear themselves
apart [195]. Siemens stated that the worm did not cause any damage to its cus-
tomers, but it is believed that the Iran nuclear program was damaged by this
cyber-attack [4, 203]. A report by Symantec showed that 60% of the infected
computers worldwide were located in Iran [102, 135, 83].
In addition, a nuclear power plant in Russia was also infected by this worm.
However, since the power plant was not connected to the public network, the sys-
tem remained safe [267]. Like Stuxnet there are many malware that has targeted
and keep targeting industrial control systems. Some examples are Shamoon [115]
and Dragonfly [13, 257]. However, to this day the latter has not been used to
attack ICS. Rather it has been used for counterfeiting [13] and cyber espionage
purposes [257]. Even though these cases affected mainly countries that are not the
United States (US), is imperative to be aware of them since the critical infrastruc-
ture of the US could be affected by similar threats.
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Furthermore, there have been cyber-attacks that targeted other systems as
well. Some of the biggest data breaches happened to companies such as Target,
The Home Depot, and Anthem. In the case of Target, cyber criminals installed
malicious software on the point of sales (POS) systems in the self-checkout lanes
from nearly 2,000 Target stores [255]. The objective of the cyber-attack was to gain
access to customer credit and debit card numbers. This malware compromised the
identities of 70 million customers and 40 million credit and debit cards [255, 276].
The same malware was later used to target The Home Depot [256]. On the other
hand, Anthem (a health insurance plan provider) was a victim of cyber criminals
when they stole approximately 80 million of medical records [276]. The attack
began with phishing emails that were sent to Anthem’s employees and it did not
became successful until some of these employees were tricked and downloaded a
trojan with a keylogger capability that enable the cyber criminals to acquire the
passwords for accessing the unencrypted data.
In addition, there has been malware that targeted regular users (people that
use general-purpose computers from the comfort of their home). Some examples of
these malware are Alureon and GameOver Zeus. Alureon, also known as TDL, is
a trojan with rootkit capabilities that was first discovered in 2008. It was created
to steal data by intercepting a system’s network traffic and whose objective was to
search for personal information such as banking usernames and passwords, credit
card data, social security numbers and other sensitive user data. It was not until
2012 in which a new variant of this malware was discovered. Like its predecessor,
it was used to steal personal information from its victims by redirecting them away
from trusted websites. The number of computers that probably were infected was
more than 277,000 worldwide, but the FBI believes that about 64,000 computers
were infected only in the United States [294].
Similarly, GameOver Zeus (GOZ), a variant from the Zeus trojan was used by
cyber criminals to send spam and phishing messages, to participate in Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and harvest banking information, such as login
credentials, from a victim’s computer [292, 11]. As many as 1.2 million computers
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were infected with this trojan prior to the takedown of the Zeus malware [186].
More examples of malware that targeted general-purpose computers can be found
in Chapter 5. Particularly, Table 5.1 lists the malware examples that were chosen
for our experiments.
16
Chapter 3
Literature Review
Malware is a malicious software that is developed by cyber criminals in or-
der to steal confidential data, hijack devices remotely to deliver massive spam
emails, launch denial of service attacks and so on. Typically, they avoid detection
by constantly changing the program’s appearance while keeping its functionality
the same. This malicious behavior is attained by manipulating the code using
multiple obfuscation techniques, such as inserting junk code and reordering in-
structions [247].
Lately, many authors of malware detection systems have attempted to address
this problem by using different detection approaches, such as byte frequency [312],
byte randomness [237], and behavioral patterns identified in the binary code of
malware examples (i.e., behavioral analysis) [229, 154, 65, 283, 133]. The byte
frequency of software refers to the frequency of the different unsigned bytes in
the corresponding file, byte randomness refers to the bytes distribution value of
the instruction sequences that are obtained from randomness tests, and behavioral
analysis refers to the type of analysis that identifies the actions performed by the
malware rather than their binary code patterns.
Next we provide an overview about previous works that have used code-based
static and dynamic behavioral-based features, as well as those previous works that
have used multimodal fusion techniques for their classification.
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3.1 Malware Detection using Behavioral-based
Features
The evolving evasion techniques being used by malware writers led to the usage
of dynamic behavioral-based features for detection of malicious software [143].
Extracting behavioral-based features involves the execution of the PE file in a
controlled environment (e.g., virtual machine and sandbox) [143]. Some types
of dynamic behavioral-based features include function call monitoring, function
parameter analysis, information flow tracking, and instruction traces [128, 143].
In addition, there are several online automated tools that helps to collect be-
havioral data from malware and non-malicious software. Some examples of such
tools are CWSandbox [293], TTAnalyzer [82], Cuckoo sandbox [30], and Payload
Security [26]. The behavioral reports generated by these tools helps malware an-
alysts to understand the malware behavior and provide valuable insight into the
actions performed by them. Some details to consider when extracting dynamic
behavioral-based features are: (1) each malware example should be executed within
a secure environment for a specific time to ensure malware examples behave as in-
tended [270]; (2) a secure environment is different from a real runtime environment
as the malware may behave differently on each of these environments, leading to
inaccurate behavior [128]; and (3) some actions of the malware example may only
be activated or triggered under certain conditions (e.g., system date and time or
direct input from the user) [167].
Compared to code-based static features, dynamic behavioral-based features
are more costly. However, dynamic behavioral-based features are more resilient
to obfuscation techniques because they extract behavior actions performed by the
malware rather than their binary code patterns. All dynamic behavioral-based
features vary in the execution environment for the malware and analysis granular-
ity. For example, a debugger (e.g., GDB [200] and WinDbg [244]) can be used for
fine-grained analysis of binary code at the instruction level and other tools, such
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as Detours [162], CWSandbox [293], TTAnalyzer [82], Cuckoo sandbox [30], and
Payload Security [26], run the malware example in a controlled environment and
monitor its behavior.
The behavior of a software application, including a malicious application, can
be characterized by its system and network activities, as well as by the analysis of
its physical properties (e.g., power consumption). Although malware detection is a
very active area of research [165, 275, 305] and dynamic behavioral-based features
has been used widely [229, 154, 65, 283, 133, 300], few works were focused on using
physical properties, such as power consumption. In this dissertation we extracted
dynamic behavioral-based features from the power consumption, network traffic
data, and system logs.
3.1.1 Power-based Features
Monitoring power consumption has been explored by previous works for the de-
velopment of new approaches to help with energy efficiency [164, 189, 134, 144,
147, 233, 219], energy theft [103, 207], and to help for integrity assessment [132].
However, for these approaches power consumption was monitored for a different
purpose than malware detection. For instance, power consumption was monitored
to help data centers understand how much power was used among the running ap-
plications across the network (in case of servers) [164, 189, 134, 144, 147], to extend
the life of the cellphone’s battery (in case of mobile devices) [233], to prevent en-
ergy theft on embedded devices [103, 207], and to improve the power consumption
on house appliances [219].
From these power-based approaches [164, 189, 134, 144, 147, 233, 219, 103, 207,
132], the work by Feng et al. [134] is the most relevant to our work as they used a
similar hardware configuration to collect power consumption data. Like us, they
used an ATX extender cable to attach the power supply unit (PSU) of the nodes to
a sensor resistor on the circuit board. Specifically, they used a RadioShack 46-range
digital multimeter (manufacturer part number 22-812) that led to a sampling rate
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of 0.25 (i.e., four samples per second). Similarly, the work by Dawson et al. [114]
used a multimeter and current clamp, which limited the sampling rate to 1Hz
for the collection of power consumption data on a general-purpose computer for
malware detection. While these works used a multimeter, our testbed used a data
acquisition system (DAQ) with a sampling rate of 0.01 second (i.e., one sample
every 10 milliseconds). Thus, in comparison to the work by Feng et al. [134] and
Dawson et al. [114], our testbed provides fine grain power consumption data.
The following subsections discusses related works that have used power-based
features for malware detection. These works focused on specific devices, such as
mobile devices [158, 313, 303, 77, 122, 123, 303, 169], embedded devices [108,
155, 107, 212], software defined radio [63, 64, 62, 62, 242], and general-purpose
computers [114, 91, 201].
A comparison of the most relevant works that have used power-based features is
given in Table 3.1. Note that the main difference among the prior works that used
power-based features is with respect to what was classified. Some works classified
sub-segments of the power consumption data as malicious or non-malicious [77, 63,
242, 62, 114], distinguished malicious from non-malicious operations (i.e., turning
the pump on/off [62, 108] or turning the lights of PLC on/off [155]), and carried
on malware detection (i.e., classified the unknown applications to malware and
non-malicious software) [158, 303, 91, 201].
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Table 3.1: Most relevant works that used power-based features
Ref. # Device Prediction Technique Learners Classification Place of Analysis Features Performance Metrics
[158] M No O N/A malware vs. non-malicious
software
N/A N/A N/A
[303] M Yes St GMM malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers N/A NR, PR, A
[77] M Yes ML-S DTW, KNN malicious vs. non-malicious
sub-segments
remote servers N/A A, R, P, F
[169] M Yes St correlation malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers N/A Approach was not evaluated.
[108] ED Yes ML-S 3-NN, MLP, RF malware vs. normal operations remote servers mean, var, max, min,
skew, Kurt, RMS, IQR
mean of A, P, R
[155] ED No O N/A cyber-attacks vs. normal
operations
N/A N/A N/A
[212] ED O No N/A buffer overflow attacks
vs. normal operations
N/A N/A N/A
[63] SDR Yes St correlation malicious vs. non-malicious
sub-segments
remote servers N/A Approach was not evaluated.
[242] SDR No O correlation malicious vs. non-malicious
sub-segments
remote servers N/A Approach was not evaluated.
[62] SDR Yes AD spectral
periodogram
malicious vs. non-malicious
sub-segments
remote servers N/A Approach was not evaluated.
[114] PC Yes AD non-linear phase
space algorithm
malicious vs. non-malicious
sub-segments
remote servers max, min, mean Approach was not evaluated.
[91] PC Yes AD,ML-S ensemble learning,
SVM
malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers mean, var, DSD, skew,
L2Norm, Kurt, and
permutation entropy
R, FDR
[201] PC Yes ML-S nested network malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers N/A mean A, AUC
Table description for each column that has abbreviations:
•Device column: M = mobile; ED = embedded device; SDR = software-defined radio; and PC = general-purpose computer
•Technique column: O = observations; St = statistic-based ; ML-S = supervised machine learning; and AD = anomaly detection
• Performance Metrics column: A = Accuracy; P = Precision; R = Recall; F = F-score; FDR = False Detection Rate; NR = Negative Rate; PR = Positive Rate; and AUC = Area Under Curve
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Mobile Devices
Before smartphones arrived to the market, previous works explored if cyber-attacks
could be detected on personal digital assistants (PDAs) by monitoring its power
consumption [168, 182, 93]. Later, with the arrival, popularity, and usability
of smartphones they became the perfect target for cyber-attacks (e.g., malicious
code) [300].
Malware detection approaches based on power consumption for mobile devices
showed inconsistent results. The approach proposed by Hoffman et al. [158] was not
successful due to the noise caused by unpredictable factors, such as user interaction
and the strength of the mobile signal. On the other hand, the methods proposed by
Yang et al. [303] and Zefferer et al. [313] were able to detect malware by monitoring
the power consumption of smartphones. A recent work presented by Azmoodeh et
al. [77] demonstrated that a specific type of malware, ransomware, can be detected
on Android devices by monitoring only the power consumption.
Furthermore, the works by Dixon et al. [122, 123] explored the effectiveness
of detecting malicious code by combining the mobile power profiles with user’s
location [122], while an extended version of this work [123] integrated time as a
feature. Results on both works demonstrated the effectiveness of these features for
finding malware with a low false positive rate and a little impact to the battery
life of smartphones.
Even though these works [77, 122, 123, 158, 303, 313] were able to detect
malware by using power consumption as a feature, it is important to note that all
of them used software-based monitoring (i.e., the PowerTutor tool) to collect the
power consumption data, which may distort the power profiles and/or be affected
by successful malicious attacks. An exception is the work by Robin et al. [169]
which built their own testbed using a Monsoon power meter for the acquisition of
power consumption data. Although preliminary results were promising in detecting
malware from non-malicious applications, the development and validation process
were not completed.
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Embedded Systems
Several approaches have been proposed to detect malware targeting embedded de-
vices (i.e., devices with a dedicated function within a larger mechanical or electrical
system) [107, 108, 155, 212].
The work by Clark et al. [108] explored whether power consumption could
be used to detect the presence of malware on two embedded devices, an embed-
ded medical device and a pharmaceutical compounder (i.e., an industrial-control
workstation). They monitored the alternate current (AC) outlet and showed that
malware can be detected based on the power consumption of embedded devices us-
ing supervised machine learning algorithms. Same author (Clark et al.) presented
in [107] two case studies in which it was proved that AC power traces can be both
harmful to privacy and beneficial for malware detection, the latter of which may
be beneficial for embedded devices (i.e., medical devices). However, the main issue
when monitoring AC relies on periodic changes in the current direction, which leads
the voltage to reverse itself, making the analog circuits much more susceptible to
noise. To avoid this problem, we monitored the direct current (DC) channels, as
some other prior works [158, 303, 77, 63, 242, 62, 114, 155, 91, 201].
Similarly, our previous work [155] presented a proof of concept study which
demonstrated through observations based on illustrative examples that cyber-
attacks can be detected by monitoring the power consumption of a Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC). Power consumption data was collected using a data ac-
quisition system (DAQ), but the hardware configuration was different than the
one used in this dissertation. The main difference relies on the sensors that were
attached to the DAQ, since the maximum voltage for the PLC rails were +24V
and here our testbed monitored four voltage rails (i.e., +3.3V rails, the +5V rails,
the +12V rails on the motherboard and the +12V rails on the CPU) whose max-
imum value is +12V. Moreover, for the experiments in [155] we simulated three
SCADA-specific cyber-attacks (i.e., command injection, replay, and Denial of Ser-
vice), while here in our experiments we used real malware examples.
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Furthermore, another work that monitored the power consumption for an em-
bedded device was presented by Moore et al. [212]. While it is important to
mention that their objective was to detect buffer overflow attacks and not mal-
ware detection, this work is still related as they used power-based features for
anomaly detection. Power consumption data was collected by using an I-jet mod-
ule, a device capable of providing power to the target board and measuring its
power consumption during program execution in real time. Power segments were
analyzed and they demonstrated that it is possible to distinguish some cases of
buffer overflow attacks (i.e., a program crash and injection of executable code)
from normal operations.
Software Defined Radio
A software defined radio (SDR) is a radio communication system in which those
components that were typically implemented in hardware (e.g., mixers, filters, and
amplifiers) are instead implemented by means of software on a general-purpose
computer or embedded system [118]. Few works explored the usage of power
consumption for SDR [63, 64, 62, 242].
Gonza´lez et al. [63] proposed an approach that relies on a mechanism that en-
ables an integrity assessment on SDR by capturing fine-grained measurements of
the processor’s power consumption and comparing them against signatures from
trusted software. Their method collects fine-grained measurements from the power
consumption during the execution of trusted code. Later, different signal process-
ing techniques were applied to extract dissimilarity measures from the power seg-
ments. After the feature extraction, these power segments were passed through
a supervised classifier or detector that has been previously trained using power
segments from trusted software. Finally, a detector compares the test segments
against all known signatures, and if no single test is enough to determine that
authorized code was executed, then an intrusion is reported. This method was
adapted by the Power Fingerprinting (PFP) firm (http://pfpcyber.com/) and can
also be applicable to embedded systems [64, 62, 242]. Nonetheless, we must em-
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phasize that these works [212, 63, 64, 62, 242] used only power segments, while
in this dissertation we are using power-based features from the whole power sig-
nal and we are combining these features with other dynamic behavioral-based and
code-based static features.
General-Purpose Computers
With respect to general-purpose computers, power consumption has received little
attention as a feature for anomaly detection due to its noisiness which prevents fine-
grained analysis of power traces [107]. Nevertheless, literature shows there are a
few power-based approaches focused on general-purpose computers for identifying
web pages by tapping the electrical outlet [106], and for malware detection [239,
290, 114, 91, 201]. From these previous works, the most relevant to our research
are [114, 91, 201].
Dawson et al. [114] proved the algorithm developed in [157] can be used to
detect the presence of malware (i.e., rootkits) through the collection and analysis
of data from voltage measurements taken from one of the power supply rails. They
collected power consumption data using a multimeter and current clamp [114, 201],
which limited the sampling rate to 1Hz. While here we used a sampling rate of
100Hz to collect the power consumption data. Using hardware-based monitoring is
more accurate and, unlike software-based monitoring tools (i.e., software used on
mobile devices to collect power consumption data [158, 303, 77]), does not affect the
power consumption on the experimental machine and is harder to be manipulated
by successful malicious attacks. Similarly, Luckett et al. [201] extended the work
in [114] by proposing a model using nested neural networks. When compared
to traditional machine learning algorithms they demonstrated that the proposed
model outperformed previous methods.
Another relevant work related to this dissertation is our previous work [91] in
which we proposed an unsupervised anomaly detection ensemble using only the
+12V CPU rails and compared its performance with several supervised kernel-
based SVM classifiers (trained on clean and infected profiles) for detecting previ-
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ously unseen malware. While we used the same hardware configuration as in [91]
to collect the power consumption data, our software tools were different. In ad-
dition, our previous work used data only for the +12V CPU rails, while here we
evaluate which voltage rail leads to best performance.
While all these works [114, 91, 201] used only power-based features and very
small sets of malware (e.g., five [91] and four [201] malware examples), in this
dissertation we used a larger set of malware and non-malicious applications (i.e.
fifty one malware examples and twenty two non-malicious applications).
3.1.2 Network Traffic-based Features
Network traffic analysis is challenging due to the dynamic nature of network traffic.
However, prior works proposed solutions to address this problem by using statistics,
data mining, and machine learning techniques [166]. Anomalies in the network
traffic data can be due to cyber-attacks, but also because of malfunctioning devices
or network overloads. Thus, using reliable network traffic data is imperative.
In this dissertation, we used the dynamic behavioral data collected from our
experimental set-up and extracted network traffic-based features, which can be
divided into two categories: commonly used network traffic features and network
flows-based features. A comparison of the most relevant works that used network
traffic-based features is given in Table 3.2. Previous works that explored commonly
used network traffic-based features have focused on network traffic classification
for botnet detection [124, 61, 316, 98, 148, 204], detection for specific types of
cyber-attacks such as Denial of Service [253], detection of anomalies related to
specific protocols (e.g., HTTP) [229, 236], classification of the network traffic itself
to malicious and benign [84], and malware detection (i.e., malicious vs. non-
malicious software) [95, 210, 230].
Besides the commonly used network traffic-based features, we are also exploring
the usage of network flows-based features for malware detection as some previous
works [124, 120, 98, 61, 316, 148, 149, 73, 289, 117, 125, 308]. Network flows-based
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features have been mainly used for detection of botnets [124, 120, 98, 61, 316, 148,
149, 227], for detection of anomalous network traffic [80], and for classification of
malware families [240, 67]. With respect to malware detection, network flows-based
features have not been extensively explored, except for a few works that focused
on network traffic classification for malware detection in Android devices [73, 289],
detection of worms [117, 125], and detection of other types of malware, such as
trojans and viruses [84, 308]. From these approaches, we focused on those methods
that used similar network traffic-based features and malware types [95, 210, 230,
117, 125, 84, 308, 240, 67].
Some of these works [95, 210, 230] executed the malware examples in a con-
trolled environment to collect the dynamic behavioral-based features for the clas-
sification of malicious and non-malicious software [95] and for malware families
classification [210, 230]. Burnap et al. [95] used machine learning techniques with
behavioral-based features (i.e., CPU, RAM, processes and network traffic) derived
from the footprint that was left behind on a computer system after the execution of
a software to classify malware from non-malicious software. Mohaisen et al. [210]
described a technique that relies on the order and frequency with which malware
examples conduct specific actions on the system. Collected .pcap files were parsed
for relevant events and subsequently n-grams features were extracted and used
for malware classification. Radu et al. [230] proposed a malware classification ap-
proach based on features such as DNS-based, accessed files, mutexes, and Registry
keys-based. The integration of these features helped to maintain the Accuracy of
the used supervised machine learning algorithm.
With respect to network flows-based features, the most relevant prior works to
ours are [117, 125, 84, 67, 308, 240]. Dubendorfer et al. [117] proposed an approach
that used network flows from high speed Internet backbones demonstrating worms
can be detected by tracking the cardinality of sudden changes in the network
traffic. Dressler et al. [125] developed a pattern based on the correlation of flow-
based features with system logs data for worms detection. Bekerman et al. [84]
presented a malware detection approach that classified malicious and non-malicious
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network traffic recorded in sandbox environments and in real networks. AlAhmadi
et al. [67] proposed an approach that analyzed and classified network traffic of
malware variants based on their network flow sequence behavior. Yeo et al. [308]
classified network packets by botnets, trojans, and viruses using a convolutional
neural network (CNN), while Rahul et al. [240] presented a CNN for classifying
network traffic of malware families.
While prior works have integrated network flows-based features with system
logs-based features for botnet detection [204], worm detection [125], malware de-
tection [95], and malware families classification [210, 230], none of these works
integrated the network traffic data and system logs with code-based static and
power-based features for the classification of unknown applications to malware
and non-malware.
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Table 3.2: Most relevant works that used network traffic-based features
Ref. # Device Prediction Technique Learners Classification Place of Analysis Features Performance Metrics
[117] PC No St N/A malicious vs. non-malicious
network traffic
N/A network flows-based N/A
[125] PC No O N/A malicious vs. non-malicious
network traffic
N/A network flows-based N/A
[84] PC Yes ML-S NB, RF, J48 malicious vs. non-malicious
network traffic
remote servers network traffic-based A, AUC
[308] PC Yes ML-S, DL CNN, MLP, RF,
SVM
malicious vs. non-malicious
network traffic
remote servers network flows-based A, P, R
[67] PC Yes ML-S KNN, RF malware families classification remote servers network flows-based P, R, F
[240] PC Yes DL CNN malware families classification remote servers network flows-based A
[95] PC Yes ML-S NB, RF, SVM,
ANN
malware vs. non-malicious remote servers network traffic-based,
CPU-based, RAM,
swap usage, and
processes-based
P, R, F
[210] PC Yes ML-S decision tree,
KNN, SVM
malware families classification remote servers network traffic-based A, P, R, F
[230] PC Yes ML-S RF malware families classification remote servers DNS-based, mutexes,
Registry keys, and
accessed files
R, P, F, FPR, AUC
Table description for each column that has abbreviations:
•Device column: M = mobile and PC = general-purpose computer
•Technique column: O = observations; St = statistical-based; ML-S = supervised machine learning; and DL = deep learning
• Performance Metrics column: A = Accuracy; P = Precision; R = Recall; F = F-score; FPR = False Positive Rate; and AUC = Area Under Curve
Chapter 3. Literature Review 29
3.1.3 System logs-based Features
Monitoring system’s behavior is of great importance for malware analysts because
it provides valuable information about the software, hardware, system processes
and system components as well as information such as error and warning events
related to the computer operating system. Previous works have used system logs-
based features for intrusion detection [72, 202, 211, 311, 133, 126], to classify mal-
ware from non-malicious software [251, 250, 113, 163, 279, 119, 197, 295, 99, 222],
for malware families classification [230, 131, 178], and for both malware detection
and malware families classification [170, 97].
From these previous works, we focused on those approaches that did malware
detection [251, 250, 113, 119, 197, 295, 170, 99, 97, 279, 163, 222]. These malware
detection approaches [251, 250, 113, 119, 197, 295, 170, 99, 97, 279, 163, 222] can
be divided based on the device being monitored (i.e., mobile devices [119, 197,
295, 170, 99, 97, 222] and general-purpose computers [251, 250, 113, 279, 163]).
A comparison of previous works that used system logs-based features for malware
detection is given in Table 3.3.
Salehi et al. [251] conducted several machine learning experiments using API
names and arguments for malware detection and for malware families classifica-
tion. For evaluation purposes, both API names and arguments were investigated
separately and then combined. Results demonstrated the Accuracy of the learners
improved by 6% when all features were used. Sainju [250] presented observations
about specific system events triggered after infecting the experimental machine
with different types of malware (e.g., trojans, worms). Dahl et al. [113] proposed
the used of random projections to further reduce the dimensionality of the original
input space before feeding the data to a neural network. This reduction technique
allowed to train the neural network with one or more hidden layers reducing the
two-class error rate by 43% when compared to Logistic Regression trained with all
features. Huynh et al. [163] proposed an online algorithm for malware detection
under concept drift when the behavior of malware changes over time. While a
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most recent work, Stiborek et al. [279], proposed a malware detection approach
using clustering techniques based on the behavior observed from system logs and
network traffic data focused on the HTTP protocol.
Data analysis was conducted via machine learning techniques for most of these
works [251, 113, 163, 279, 119, 197, 295, 170, 99, 97, 222], except for [250] which pre-
sented observations about the behavior of specific malware examples. Most of these
works used only system logs-based features [251, 113, 163, 250, 119, 295, 99, 97, 170]
or combined the system logs-based features with network traffic-based fea-
tures [279]. In the case of mobile devices, some works combined system logs-based
features with permissions [197] and with permissions and intent [222]. Interestingly,
none of these works combined the system logs-based features with code-based static
features or with other behavioral-based features like power consumption, which is
explored in this dissertation.
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Table 3.3: Most relevant works that used system logs-based features
Ref. # Device Prediction Technique Learners Classification Place of Analysis Features Performance Metrics
[251] PC Yes ML-S RF, J48, FT, SMO,
NB, VFI, HyperPipes
malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API names and API
arguments
A, P, R, AUC, RMS
[250] PC No O N/A malware vs. non-malicious
software
N/A system log events N/A
[113] PC Yes ML-S Logistic Regression
Neural Network
malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API calls-based FPR, FNR
[279] PC Yes ML-S proposed approach malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers system logs and
network traffic data
A, R, FPR
[163] PC Yes ML-S proposed approach malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API arguments, file
system, and Registry
MCAE
[119] M Yes ML-S RF, Ridge Regression,
SVM, Lasso
malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API traces R, TNR
[197] M Yes ML-S Neural Network malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API arguments
and permissions
A
[295] M Yes ML-S proposed approach malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API arguments A, P, R, F, FPR, FNR
[99] M Yes ML-S RF, NB, SGD malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API traces R, P, F, FPR
[97] M Yes ML-S SVM malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API traces and
permissions
A, FPR, FNR
[222] M Yes ML-S SVM, ANN,
Logistic Regression
malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers system logs, intent
and permissions
A, P, R, F
[170] M Yes ML-S proposed approach malware vs. non-malicious
software
remote servers API arguments and
system logs
A, FPR, FNR
Table description for each column that has abbreviations:
•Device: M = mobile and PC = general-purpose computer
•Technique: O = observations; and ML-S = supervised machine learning
• Performance Metrics: A = Accuracy; P = Precision; R = Recall; F = F-score; FPR = False Positive Rate; TNR = True Negative Rate; FNR = False Negative Rate; and
MCAE = Mean Cumulative Absolute Error
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3.2 Malware Detection Using Code-Based Static
Features
Static analysis is the way to extract malicious features or bad code segments with-
out executing the PE file [305, 143]. Before conducting the static analysis, the PE
file has to be unpacked and decrypted. There are tools that are either a disas-
sembler (e.g., IDA Pro [35]) or a memory dumper (e.g., OllyDump [38]) that can
be used to reverse PE files. Disassembler tools display malware code as assembly
instructions, while memory dumper tools are used to obtain protected code located
in the main memory and dumps them into a file for further analysis [305, 143].
The main advantage of using code-based static features is that they help to
explore and investigate all possible execution paths in malware examples. In ad-
dition, the experimental machine cannot be infected by the malware under study.
However, a disadvantage of code-based static features relies on the fact that they
are susceptible to code obfuscation. Moser et al. [214] explored the limitations
of code-based static features and suggested that code-based static features alone
are not enough for malware detection and stated that dynamic behavioral-based
features can be a necessary and useful complement to code-based static features.
Most of the previous works that have used code-based static features for mal-
ware detection [262, 252, 191, 60, 177, 129, 205, 70, 260, 304, 301, 258, 209, 137,
181, 70, 192, 176, 68] focused on the detection of patterns using features extracted
from Windows API calls [262, 252], byte n-grams [191, 60, 177, 129, 205, 70, 260],
strings [262, 304], opcodes (operational codes) [301, 258, 209, 137, 181], and control
flow graphs (CFG) [70, 192, 176, 68].
Windows API calls are used by most of the programs to send specific requests
to the operating system. As such, these features are useful for malware detection
since they reflect the behavior of program code pieces [305]. These features are
commonly used by previous works in combination with other code-based static
features [307, 302]. For example, API calls-based features have been combined
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with headers-based features [307] and with control flow graphs [302].
Byte n-grams are substrings in the program code with a length of N [305].
These code-based static features can be extracted from malware examples and
are used as a signature for recognizing malicious software. Using byte n-grams
for malware detection is convenient because they yield high accuracy in detecting
unknown malware [241]. Hence, they have been well explored over the last decade
by previous works that focused on the binary code content [191, 60, 177, 129, 205,
70].
Strings features are based on encoded plain text and are typically a high-
level specification of malicious behavior considering they can show the attacker’s
intent [304]. However, they are not commonly used by prior works because they
can easily be manipulated by an attacker [241]. Operational code (opcode) refers to
the portion of a machine instruction that specifies the operation to be performed.
Literature on malware detection specifies that opcode-based features are more
efficient and successful for classification, since they reveal statistical diversities
between malicious and non-malicious applications [241]. Some prior works that
explored the usage of n-gram opcode sequence for malware detection are [86, 215,
264, 194].
Finally, CFG are graphs that represent the control flow of a PE file and are
commonly used in software analysis [70], malware detection [92, 68], and for both
malware detection and malware families classification [176]. The problem with
those approaches that use CFG-based features is that they require a database of
signatures, meaning that it can detect known malware but may not be able to
detect unknown malware [88]. Furthermore, maintaining this database is time and
resource consuming.
Another type of code-based static feature used by previous works are the
portable executable-based features. This type of code-based static features are
extracted using the structural information from an executable file [241]. By struc-
tural information, we refer to the following pieces of information from a PE file: (1)
file pointer; (2) import section; (3) export section; (4) PE header; and (5) resource
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directory.
File pointer is the pointer that denotes the position within the file as it is stored
on the hard disk drive. The import section include features, such as functions from
which DLLs and object files are used. The export section describes which functions
are exported. Header-based features describe the physical and logical structure of
a PE binary and may include features like code size and debug size. Resource
directory-based features are those features that are indexed by a multiple-level-
binary-sorted-tree structure. Examples of these resource directory-based features
are the dialogs and cursors which are used by a specific PE file. Resource directory-
based features are meaningful for malware analysts because they indicate if the
executable file was manipulated to perform malicious activity.
In this dissertation the extracted code-based static features can be grouped
into three categories: (1) headers-based features, (2) data directories-based fea-
tures, and (3) DLL dependencies-based features. Similar PE-based features were
extracted and used by prior works for malware detection [265, 261, 190, 81, 220],
malware families classification [299], and for both malware detection and malware
families classification [190].
The works by Bat-Erdene et al. [81] and Yan et al. [299] extracted and used
headers-based features, while the works by Saxe et al. [261] and Narouei et al. [220]
extracted and used DLL dependencies-based features. Similarly, Shafiq et al. [265]
extracted and combined the headers-based features, data directories-based fea-
tures, and DLL dependencies-based features into one feature vector for malware
detection. On the other hand, Kolosnjaji et al. [190] extracted and combined
headers-based features and DLL-based features for both malware detection and
malware families classification.
Although similar code-based static features have been explored by previous
works, none of these works [265, 261, 190, 81, 220, 299, 190] combined code-based
static features with dynamic behavioral-based features nor explored the perfor-
mance of using different modalities for malware detection, which is explored in
this dissertation.
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3.3 Multimodal Learning for Malware Detection
Feature level fusion is widely used by prior works for malware detection [205, 70,
259, 167, 306, 299, 277, 199, 315]. However, none of these works called it feature
level fusion. These prior works mentioned that “all features were combined into one
feature vector”, which is the definition of feature level fusion. While other prior
works mentioned that both code-based and dynamic behavioral-based features
were used for malware detection, which is the definition of multimodal (i.e., using
features from multiple sources).
Similarly, previous works [205, 269, 314, 310, 101, 111] have done decision level
fusion, but they were unimodal. Thus, we labeled these prior works as feature
level and decision level fusion, which are described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2,
respectively.
3.3.1 Feature Level Fusion
Many prior works have done feature level fusion for malware detection [205, 70, 259,
167, 306, 299, 277, 199, 315]. These works can be divided based on the device being
monitored (i.e., mobile devices [277, 199] and general-purpose computers [205, 70,
259, 167, 306, 299, 315]).
Both of the mobile devices approaches [277, 199] combined code-based static
and dynamic behavioral-based features (i.e., Spreitzenbarth et al. [277] used fea-
tures like API calls and network traffic data, while Lindorfer et al. [199] used fea-
tures like class structure, application names, file operations, and network activity)
to classify malware from non-malicious software. With respect to those approaches
that targeted general-purpose computers [205, 70, 259, 167, 306, 299, 315], some
did malware detection [205, 70, 259, 306], malware families classification [167, 315],
and both malware detection and malware families classification [299]. Furthermore,
the works in [70, 259, 167, 299, 315] used both code-based static and dynamic
behavioral-based features, while the works in [205] used only code-based static
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features and [306] used file relations. With respect to which learners were used,
most of the prior works used SVM [205, 70, 306, 277, 199]. While others explored
SVM with other learners like KNN and Decision Trees [259], Random Forest [167],
and KNN, Naive Bayes, and Decision Trees [299]. Besides SVM, the work by [315]
used K-means with hierarchical clustering.
In this dissertation, we focus on those approaches that used similar features as
ours for malware detection on a general-purpose computer [70, 259, 299]. Ander-
son et al. [70] described how to combine both code-based static (e.g., opcodes and
CFGs) and dynamic behavioral-based features (e.g., API traces) using multiple
kernel learning methods. Santos et al. [259] proposed a machine learning approach
that combined static (opcode sequences) and dynamic data (API traces), while
Yan et al. [299] conducted a systematic study using different feature types and
experimented with different combinations of feature selection algorithms and clas-
sifiers.
3.3.2 Decision Level Fusion
Prior works show two types of integration strategies: classifier fusion and decision
strategy. In classifier fusion (also known as multi-classifier system), the classifier
combination process involves merging the individual (weaker) classifier to obtain a
single (stronger) expert of superior performance [249, 234]. Examples of classifier
fusion methods include boosting [140], bagging [89], and some variations of bagging
like Random Forest [90]. Decision strategy combines information in a simple and
straightforward way. Let us assume a system that consists of multiple modalities
(M = {m1,m2,m3, ...,mn}), each of which uses a trait and makes the authentica-
tion decision independently. The decision level strategy is then used to combine
the decisions of the subsystem to produce the final decision.
Some previous works have done classifier fusion for malware detection [205,
269, 314, 310, 101, 111, 66, 78, 309, 291]. These works can be divided based on
the device being monitored (i.e., mobile devices [269, 310, 101, 111, 309, 291] and
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general-purpose computers [205, 314, 66, 78]). From those works that monitored
general purpose computers, some did malware detection [205, 78] and malware
families classification [314, 66]. The fusion techniques explored by these works
were boosting [205], ensemble selection [78], stacking [314], and both boosting and
bagging [66].
With respect to previous works that have done decision strategy for malware
detection [315, 287, 146, 213], they can also be divided based on the device being
monitored (i.e., mobile devices [315], and general-purpose computers [287, 146,
213]). Zhang et al. [315] proposed an unsupervised machine learning approach that
used different modalities (i.e., PE-based and API calls-based features) for malware
families classification. To combine the information from all modalities, a clustering
ensemble based on mixture model was used. Wang et al. [287] presented a malware
detection approach that used API calls-based features for malware detection using
a linear weighted fusion method. Guo et al. [146] designed a multiple classification
algorithm based on the Behavior Knowledge Space (BKS) algorithm using API
calls for malware detection. Extracted features were divided into seven subsets
(i.e., file I/O, DLL, network, memory, process, Registry, and socket), each subset
was classified using several machine learning algorithms, and the data was fused
using BKS. More et al. [213] presented a malware detection system consisting of
disassemble process, code-based static features extraction, and feature selection
using majority voting and veto voting.
Only two prior works have used multimodal learning for malware detection [193,
184]. Both works monitored mobile devices, but [193] focused on feature level
fusion, while [184] focused on decision level fusion.
Pramod et al. [193] proposed a machine learning approach that collected various
applications files from different sources and pre-processed these files into various
images format (i.e., grayscale, RGB, CMYK, and HSL). Extracted image-based
features were used to train three machine learning algorithms (i.e., Decision Tree,
Random Forest, and k Nearest Neighbor). The performance of each machine learn-
ing algorithm were evaluated on various metrics, such as Recall, Precision, F-score,
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and Accuracy. Results show Random Forest outperformed the other learners with
a detection Accuracy of 91%. Kim et al. [184] presented a multimodal deep learning
algorithm using different types of code-based static features (e.g., opcodes, API,
permissions, and component environmental). The proposed framework conducts
four major steps before doing the malware detection: raw data extraction pro-
cess, feature extraction process, feature vector generation process, and detection
process. Results show that the proposed approach attained an Accuracy rate of
98%.
From these prior works, the work by Kim et al. [184] is the most relevant to
our work as they used a multimodal deep learning neural network for malware
detection. However, there are several differences that distinguish our work from
theirs:
• Kim et al. [184] used only code-based static features, while we are combining
dynamic behavioral-based with code-based static features.
• Prior works [193, 184] monitored mobile devices, while here we monitored a
general-purpose computer.
• The structure of our deep neural network is different than the one presented
in [184]. For instance, [184] used ReLU as activation function, and this
function has the problem that turns all negative numbers to zero, which
decreases the ability of the model to fit or train the data properly. To avoid
this problem, in our multimodal approach we used the exponential linear unit
function (ELU) as activation function. Furthermore, the number of hidden
layers and neurons is distinct.
• None of these works compared the performance of feature level with decision
level fusion, which is explored in this dissertation.
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Chapter 4
Preliminary Experimental Set-up
& Proof of Concept Study
This chapter describes the initial experimental set-up and explains how we
conducted a proof of concept study that explored the use of power consumption for
malware detection (i.e., rootkit) in a general-purpose computer. The contribution
here is the experimental design and unique solutions to the data collection. The
work presented in this Chapter has been published in the 17th IEEE International
Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
(TrustCom) [91].
4.1 Initial Experimental Set-up
4.1.1 Hardware Configuration
Our experimental system is a Dell OptiPlex 755 computer with a clean installa-
tion of 32-bit Windows 7 Ultimate. The instrumentation for our experiments was
a Data Acquisition system (DAQ), Model Number: USB-1608G Series [20]. The
DAQ connects to the device’s motherboard power connector, and the voltage and
current are collected on each of the direct current (DC) power channels. The com-
munication between the experimental machine and the data repository machine
(i.e., machine that stores the power consumption data) was established through
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USB port. The DAQ provides relatively high-resolution power data, is able to
sample at a rate of 250KHz, and can monitor up to sixteen channels. Besides the
DAQ, we also used an eight inch Advanced Technology eXtended (ATX) power ca-
ble that had one male and one female 24-pin connector. The 24-pin male connector
was attached to the motherboard, and the 24-pin female connector was attached to
the power supply unit (PSU). A PSU is an electronic device that supplies electric
energy to an electric load. Specifically, a PSU converts alternate current (AC) to
low-voltage regulated DC current for the internal components of a computer [18].
Power supplies are rated in terms of how many watts they generate. Most power
supplies have overcurrent protection (OCP) to protect the circuit when the cur-
rent reaches a value that will cause an excessive or dangerous temperature rise in
conductors [160].
Each group of wires on the PSU are connected to a single OCP circuit that is
called a rail. A PSU has three voltage rails: +3.3V, +5V, and +12V. The +3.3V
rails and +5V rails are used by the digital electronic components and circuits in
the system, such as adapter cards and disk drive logic boards [216]. The disk drive
motors, CPU voltage regulators, and cooling fans are used by the +12V rails on
the motherboard [216]. Table 4.1 provides a list of the devices that are typically
powered by these voltage rails.
To ensure the power consumption data was collected adequately, three hard-
ware configurations were tested. The first hardware configuration consisted of an
ATX power extender cable and several minigrabbers. A minigrabber is a micro-
hook test clip that allows analog discovery’s signal wires to be connected to com-
ponent leads, wires, and other circuit components [16, 17]. Before using the min-
igrabbers, we had to solder a wire on each micro clip manually. Figure 4.1 shows
the DAQ used for the data collection, and Figure 4.2 shows how the minigrabbers
looks like after the soldering process.
Using the first hardware configuration we monitored a total of eleven DC power
channels (four pins had a signal of +3.3V, five pins had a signal of +5V, and two
pins had a signal of +12V). Figure 4.3 shows the signal of each pin for version 2.0
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of the ATX standard connectors and Figure 4.4 shows the first hardware configu-
ration.
Table 4.1: Voltage rail usage for a general-purpose computer
Rail Devices Powered
+3.3V chipsets, some DIMMs, PCI/AGP/PCIe cards, miscellaneous chips
+5V disk drive logic, low-voltage motors, SIMMs, PCI/AGP/ISA cards,
and voltage regulators
+12V motors, high-output voltage regulators, AGP/PCIe cards
+12V CPU CPU
Acronyms:
• SIMM = Single Inline Memory Module
•DIMM = Dual Inline Memory Module
• PCI = Peripheral Component Interconnect
• PCIe = PCI Express
•AGP = Accelerated Graphics Port
• ISA = Industry Standard Architecture
•CPU = Central Processing Unit
Figure 4.1: USB-1608G DAQ Figure 4.2: Minigrabbers
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Figure 4.3: ATX connector Figure 4.4: First configuration
The issue with the first hardware configuration was that the DAQ by itself
collected only the voltage consumption, and since we were interested in power,
both the voltage and current were required. To address this challenge, several
options were studied in the second hardware configuration. The first option was
to use a DC current switch and transducers, while a second option was to use
a compact DC voltage and current sense print circuit board (PCB) with analog
output.
The problem with the DC current switch and transducers was that the output
for the samples were in milliampere (mA), while the DC voltage and current sense
PCB provides the samples in amperes (A). Since we wanted to establish a difference
between malicious and non-malicious behavior, having the samples in mA will be
challenging because an mA is just a decimal fraction of an ampere. Also, the DC
current switch and transducers were expensive in comparison with the compact
DC voltage and current sense PCB with analog output. For these reasons, we
decided to use the compact DC voltage and current sense PCB for collecting the
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current consumption of the experimental machine.
The DC voltage and current sense PCB determines the DC current by mea-
suring the voltage drop across a shunt resistor, and then converts that current to
analog voltage output [6]. A shunt resistor is a device that allows electric current to
pass around another point in the circuit by creating a low resistance path [19, 21].
For the second hardware configuration, the PCBs were welded to those wires on
the ATX power extender cable that we were interested in monitoring (i.e., +3.3V,
+5V, and +12V rails). Figure 4.5 shows the voltage and current sense PCB that
was used for the second hardware configuration, while Figure 4.6 shows the second
hardware configuration.
Figure 4.5: Voltage and current
sense PCB Figure 4.6: Second configuration
Using the second hardware configuration left a total of fourteen DC power
channels to be monitored (eleven channels were used to measure the current and
the other three channels were used to measure the voltage). That is, one voltage
value for all the rails that were +3.3V, one value for all the rails that were +5V,
and one value for all the rails that were +12V. While testing this configuration,
we noticed that there were two +12V rails that were powering the CPU of the
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experimental machine. These +12V rails were separate from the rails that we
were already monitoring on the ATX power extender cable. Specifically, the +12V
rails were connected from the PSU to a 4-pin ATX12V power connector on the
motherboard. Including these rails, we ended up monitoring a total of sixteen
channels. 1
Monitoring sixteen channels at the same time was challenging because, when
post-processing, we had to sum several measured currents together. To simplify the
hardware configuration, we evaluated other options that could help us to reduce
the number of channels to be monitored. After some exploring we found that all
wires from the same voltage value were soldered together on the same contact point
on the power supply. This means that all the +3.3V rails were connected to the
same contact point, and the same was true for the +5V rails, and the +12V rails.
Figure 4.7 shows the +12V rails soldered together on the same contact point in
the power supply.
Figure 4.7: +12V rails soldered on the same contact point in the PSU
The third hardware configuration emerged from this observation. We grouped
all the +3.3V rails on the same voltage and current sense PCB which was attached
to the ATX power extender cable; the same was done for the +5V rails and the
1A survey of other machines was made to verify that general-purpose computers have the
4-pin ATX12V power connector. More than twenty computers were verified and all of them had
the 4-pin ATX12V power connector.
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+12V rails. Figure 4.8 shows the third hardware configuration used during the
experiments and Figure 4.9 shows how the wires from the ATX power extender
cable were attached to the DAQ.
Figure 4.8: Third configuration Figure 4.9: Wires attached to DAQ
Grouping the voltage rails reduced the numbers of channels to be monitored
to six—three channels for measuring the current, and the other three channels for
measuring the voltage. In addition, we also included the two +12V rails that power
the CPU. Overall, instead of monitoring fifteen channels, we reduced the number
to eight—four voltage channels and four corresponding current channels. This
hardware configuration was the one used for the experiments and data collection
described in this dissertation. It was chosen because it allowed us to obtain the
same power consumption data as the second configuration, but with less monitoring
channels.
4.1.2 Software Configuration
Initially, we used a tool called TracerDAQ Pro (version 2.3.1.0), which is an out-of-
the box virtual instrument that acquires and displays power consumption data [20].
This tool ran on a different machine (data collection repository machine) in order
to provide integrity during the data collection process. The acquired power con-
sumption data from the experimental machine was stored as a comma-separated
value (.csv) file on the data collection repository machine.
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TracerDAQ Pro provides options such as strip chart, oscilloscope, function
generator, and rate generator. When testing the first and second hardware config-
uration, we used only the strip chart option since we were interested in monitoring
all eight channels simultaneously. For the first and second hardware configuration,
power consumption data was collected using a sampling rate of 100Hz, a sampling
interval of 0.01 seconds, and the data was collected for five minutes. At the end,
30,000 samples per channel were obtained.
As our experimental design evolved, we found that TracerDAQ Pro was not
suitable for obtaining precise power consumption data. To address this issue we
developed our own Visual Basic program. Our program was written in Visual Basic
since the libraries (.dll files) from the DAQ were compatible with the Microsoft
.NET framework. By using our software, the collected power consumption data
was stored as a comma-separated value (.csv) file on a different machine (the data
collection repository machine). The communication between the data collection
repository machine and the experimental machine was established through the
USB port. Figure 4.10 shows the graphical user interface (GUI) of our “DAQ
Monitoring Tool” software.
Figure 4.10: GUI for the “DAQ Monitoring Tool” software
To ensure the malware will not spread around the main network, we designed
a segregated network, which consisted of the experimental machine, the data col-
lection repository machine, a switch, and a cellular data connection. The data
collection repository machine was connected to the personal hotspot, and then
through a network switch the wireless connection was shared with the experi-
mental machine. The advantages from the use of a segregated network are: (1)
allowing the malware to behave normally, while avoiding the possibility of infect-
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ing other machines on the network, and (2) allowing us to monitor and record the
experimental machine’s network traffic.
In addition to our “DAQ Monitoring Tool” software, Wireshark was used to
collect the network traffic of the experimental machine with the objective of vali-
dating that the experimental machine was successfully infected with the rootkits
being tested. As part of the network traffic analysis, we organized the protocols
on the .pcap file by alphabetical order and then focused only on the column for
the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol. From the domains that were cap-
tured, one of them got our attention (term0l5ter12.com). Interestingly, several
websites [29, 8] had this domain registered as malicious. After all these analyses,
we were certain that the experimental machine was successfully infected with the
chosen rootkits.
4.2 Data Collection & Analysis
The power consumption of the experimental machine was collected in two different
scenarios: non-malicious behavior (no rootkit running on the system) and mali-
cious behavior (a rootkit was running on the system). For the data collection
workflow, we assumed a clean installation of Windows, then power consumption
data was collected and labeled as non-malicious. Subsequently, the experimental
machine was infected and power consumption data was collected and labeled as
malicious. For this case study we infected the experimental machine with two
rootkits: Alureon and Pihar.
The first rootkit, Alureon, also known as TDL4 or TDSS, is a Trojan that allows
an attacker to intercept incoming and outgoing Internet traffic in order to gather
confidential information such as user names, passwords, and credit card data [10].
There are several generations of this type of malware, and for our experiments,
we used the fourth generation [28]. Typically, it infects a computer via drive-
by download through a questionable website, often a distributor of pornography
or pirated media [246]. Once Alureon is installed on the machine, the software
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searches the system for any competitor’s malware and removes it. It also uses an
encryption algorithm to hide its communications from traffic analysis tools that are
sometimes used to detect suspicious transmissions [246]. Furthermore, this rootkit
can manipulate the master boot record (MBR) of the computer to ensure that it
is loaded early during the bootup process so that it can interfere with the loading
of the OS [9]. The second rootkit, which is a variant of Alureon, is a Trojan called
Purple Haze (also known as Pihar). Like Alureon, this rootkit can modify the
MBR of the machine, as well as changing system settings and reconfiguring the
Windows Registry. Its rootkit capabilities include disabling the anti-virus (AV)
software to keep itself hidden [24].
To initiate the data collection process, we wrote two scripts: a Python script
that executes a sequence of events, and a C++ program that inserted what we will
called a marker. The objective of the Python script was to ensure repeatability,
while the objective of the marker was to insert a signal into the measured power
consumption data to mark the start and end points for each sequence of events
(i.e., idle, opening IE, and booting/rebooting).
When the Python script is executed, it launches two markers before the ex-
perimental machine goes idle for a minute. Then, the Python script opens ten
windows of Internet Explorer (IE) each with five seconds delay. IE was chosen be-
cause the Alureon and Pihar rootkits affect the performance of browsers [15, 245].
Figure 4.11 shows the sequence of events during the data collection process for the
+12V CPU rails. The events (idle, opening IE, booting/rebooting) were recorded
during three states: (1) prior to infection, (2) after infection, and (3) after infec-
tion plus reboot. In order to segment these sections of the power profile, we used
the marker to stress the CPU of the experimental machine for five seconds. The
Python script places markers in the power consumption data before and after the
events were recorded. The advantage of using these markers is that they allow us
to understand when a particular event occurs and how long it takes to complete
its execution. This workflow was completed, for each rootkit, three times for the
four monitored voltage rails.
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Figure 4.11: Sequence of events during the data collection process
After the data collection, the power consumption data was pre-processed by
multiplying the voltage and current for the monitored rails. Then, we wrote a
Matlab script to separate the events based on their start and end point for further
analysis. The MATLAB script returns the start and end point of all the markers
that appeared on the dataset. For this case study, there were a total of eighteen
markers. Once we had the start and end point for each event, the next step was
to compare those events that were related to each other. Specifically, we were
interested in the following comparisons: (1) when the machine was booting prior
to infection versus when the machine was rebooting after infection; (2) idle prior
to infection versus idle after infection; (3) idle prior to infection versus idle after
infection and reboot; (4) when opening IE windows prior to infection versus when
opening IE windows after infection; and (5) when opening IE windows prior to
infection versus when opening IE windows after infection and reboot.
4.3 Preliminary Results
The hypothesis under investigation in this proof of concept was if there is a dif-
ference in the power consumption of a general-purpose computer after malware
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(i.e., rootkit) infection. To prove or disprove this hypothesis, several experiments
were conducted and power profiles were collected for specific events (i.e., idle,
opening IE, and booting/rebooting). This was done for the rootkits Alureon and
Pihar. For each rootkit there were three datasets. Each dataset contains the power
consumption obtained for each monitored voltage rail. The comparison between
the non-malicious and malicious state was done for each of the events that were
recorded on the four monitored voltage rails. Five graphs were generated for each
monitored voltage rail. The x axis for each of these graphs shows “Data Points”,
which refers to the total of power readings that were sampled every 10 millisec-
onds. For example, if a graph shows 3, 000 data points that would be equivalent
to thirty seconds.
4.3.1 +3.3V Rails
These rails are typically used by digital electronic components and circuits in the
system, such as memory. When comparing the power profiles of booting prior
to infection versus when it was rebooting after infection, we noticed that at the
beginning the power consumption was lower and subsequently both events kept
their power consumption similar to each other. Regarding the other events (i.e.,
idle and opening IE), results showed that the difference in the power consumption
cannot be established by the naked eye. After analyzing all six datasets (i.e., three
datasets per rootkit), we concluded that the +3.3V rails were not very useful for
detecting different behaviors between the non-malicious and malicious power pro-
files because these voltage rails are used to power up memory, and that component
does not consume as much power as the hard disk drive or CPU.
4.3.2 +5V Rails
For all datasets, when comparing booting prior to infection with the rebooting
after infection for the +5V rails, we noticed the same behavior as the +3.3V rails,
that is the power consumption after infection was lower at the beginning of the
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initialization process, but later it kept the same pace as the non-malicious behavior.
Hence, comparing booting prior to infection versus booting after infection for the
+5V rails is not sufficient to distinguish between non-malicious and malicious
behavior.
When we compared idle prior to infection versus idle after infection with
Alureon we obtained an increment in the power consumption after the experimen-
tal machine was infected for two out of the three datasets (66.67% of the time),
while for Pihar we noticed an increment in the power consumption for all datasets
(100% of the time). However, when comparing idle prior to infection versus idle
after infection and reboot for both rootkits, we noticed that the power profiles
for both scenarios (malicious and non-malicious) were at the same level. In other
words, a distinguishable difference cannot be made by the naked eye. Furthermore,
when comparing all the graphs in which the experimental machine was idle we no-
ticed a delay in the power consumption data after the experimental machine was
infected. We believe this delay is because after the infection more processes are
running and this extra work consumes more power. Figure 4.12 shows the power
consumption after infecting the experimental machine with the Alureon rootkit.
As can be seen from Figure 4.12, the power consumption in the idle state was
higher after the infection than prior to infection. Hence, this comparison is a good
criterion for detecting malware through the power consumption.
Figure 4.12: Power consumption for idle prior to infection vs. idle after infection
with Alureon for the +5V rails
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When IE was opened prior to infection versus after the infection with Alureon,
we noticed an increment in the power consumption after infection for two out of
three datasets (66.67% of the time). In the case of the Pihar rootkit, this behavior
was seen only in one out of three datasets (33.33% of the time). Figure 4.13 shows
the power consumption after opening IE prior to infection versus after infection
for the Alureon rootkit.
Figure 4.13: Power consumption for opening IE prior to infection vs. opening IE
after infection with Alureon for the +5V rails
From Figure 4.13 we can see an increment in the power consumption when
some IE windows were opened. Interestingly, this increment was seen when some
windows of IE were jammed. This was consistent with the behavior we saw during
the data collection process and later was confirmed when analyzing the .pcap file.
Based on network traffic data, we noticed that Alureon was trying to redirect the
search engine to advertisement websites. However, when IE was opened prior to
infection versus after the infection and reboot for both rootkits, a difference by the
naked eye could not be established.
4.3.3 +12V Rails on the Motherboard
The +12V rails on the motherboard are used to power up the hard disk drive
motors and the fans. For one of the Alureon datasets results showed that the
power consumption was higher after the infection compared to when it was booted
prior to infection (33.33% of the time). However for the other two datasets, we
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saw similar behavior as in the case of +3.3V and +5V rails. Figure 4.14 shows an
increment in the power consumption after the experimental machine was infected
with Alureon during the initialization process. In the case of Pihar, an increment
in the power consumption was noticeable on two out of three datasets (66.67% of
the time).
Figure 4.14: Power consumption for booting prior to infection vs. booting after
infection with Alureon for the +12V rails on the motherboard
When comparing the idle state (idle prior to infection versus idle after infec-
tion and idle prior to infection versus idle after infection and reboot), results for
Alureon showed an increment in the power consumption after infection for two out
of the three datasets (66.67% of the time). Similar increment was seen in all three
datasets of Pihar (100% of the time). Figure 4.15 shows an increment in the power
consumption when comparing idle prior to infection versus idle after infection and
reboot for the Alureon rootkit.
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Figure 4.15: Power consumption for idle prior to infection vs. idle after infection
and reboot with Alureon for the +12V rails on the motherboard
Nonetheless, when comparing IE (IE prior to infection versus after infection
and IE prior to infection versus after infection and reboot), results for Alureon
showed that an increment in the power consumption after infection can be seen in
only one of the datasets (33.33% of the time). Figure 4.16 shows an increment in
the power consumption when comparing IE prior to infection versus IE after the
Alureon infection and reboot.
Figure 4.16: Power consumption for opening IE prior to infection vs. opening IE
after infection and reboot with Alureon for the +12V rails on the motherboard
When comparing IE prior to infection versus IE after infection for Pihar, we
noticed an increment in the power consumption after infection for one out of the
three datasets (33.33% of the time). Interestingly, when comparing IE prior to
infection versus IE after infection and reboot we noticed the power consumption
of the experimental machine was higher after infection for all datasets (100% of
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the time).
After analyzing the +12V rails on the motherboard, we concluded these rails
are useful when distinguishing the non-malicious and malicious power profiles.
4.3.4 +12V CPU Rails
The +12V CPU rails are separate from the +12V rails on the motherboard (mon-
itored in the PSU). They are used to power the CPU or graphics processing unit
(GPU) of a general-purpose computer. The +12V rails on the motherboard are
used to power hard disk drive motors and fans.
The comparison between the power consumption when the experimental ma-
chine was booting prior to infection versus when it was booting after infection
showed that at the beginning of the initialization process the power consumption
was higher prior to infection for both rootkits. However, at some point during
the initialization, an increment in the power consumption after infection was no-
ticeable. This comparison by itself does not provide information that can help us
to distinguish between non-malicious and malicious behavior because of the pres-
ence of noise. Noise is expected during the booting and rebooting process because
the system is executing several processes simultaneously, so even if the malware is
present, its challenging to differentiate between non-malicious and malicious states.
In the case of idle (idle prior to infection versus after infection and idle prior to
infection versus after infection and reboot), we noticed that the power consump-
tion for both rootkits in the non-malicious and malicious scenarios were similar.
However, there were some higher spikes after infection. We believe these spikes
were generated when the system was executing non-malicious processes. Similarly,
these spikes were also seen in the +5V rails.
A similar behavior was noticeable during IE execution (IE prior to infection
versus after infection and IE prior to infection versus after infection and reboot).
Results showed that for both non-malicious and malicious power profiles, the power
consumption was similar. In addition, some delays were seen on the experimen-
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tal machine after it was infected. Figure 4.17 shows the power consumption for
opening IE prior to infection versus opening IE after infection for the Alureon
rootkit.
Figure 4.17: Power consumption for opening IE prior to infection vs. opening IE
after infection with Alureon for the +12V CPU rails
After analyzing all six datasets (three datasets per rootkit), we concluded that
a distinguishable difference cannot be made by the naked eye when analyzing the
non-malicious and malicious power profiles for the +12V CPU rails. These results
are not the ones we expected, because by monitoring the CPU of the general-
purpose computer we thought these voltage rails would be more informative. How-
ever, we are aware that many processes are running and this extra work consumes
more power making it difficult to establish a difference by the naked eye. Fur-
thermore, using power consumption to distinguish malware from non-malicious
software can be done by using machine learning techniques, which is explored in
this dissertation.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Set-up & Data
Collection
Based on what we learned from experiments presented in Chapter 4, in this
chapter we describe the software tools used in our testbed and explain the con-
ducted experiments when collecting data from multiple modalities (i.e., power
consumption, network traffic data, and system logs). Note that the data collected
in this Chapter was used for the experiments described in Chapters 8, 9, and 10.
5.1 Testbed Design & Development
5.1.1 Hardware & Software Configuration
Although we used the same hardware configuration that is described in Chapter 4,
the software configuration of our testbed was modified to collect the power con-
sumption, the network traffic data and system logs simultaneously. We designed a
segregated network (described in Subsection 4.1.2), which consisted of the exper-
imental machine, the data collection repository machine, a switch, and a cellular
data connection, as shown in Figure 5.1. The data collection repository machine
was connected to the personal hotspot, and then through a network switch the
wireless connection was shared with the experimental machine. The experimental
machine had unfiltered Internet access, which is crucial for the malware samples
Chapter 5. Experimental Set-up & Data Collection 58
to perform their full functionality, as most malware initiates network traffic (e.g.,
contacts the command and control servers).
Figure 5.1: Experimental set-up
Several software tools were used for the experimental design. We used
ClockSynchro [33] to synchronize the clocks of the experimental machine and the
data collection repository machine, Wireshark [42] to collect the network traffic
data, CaptureBAT [32] to collect the system logs, and the Clonezilla applica-
tion [14] to ensure that the hard disk drive of the experimental machine contained
a clean (i.e., uninfected) copy of the Windows OS.
5.2 Data Collection Set-up
5.2.1 Dynamic Behavioral Data Collection
To conduct the dynamic analysis, the executable files were launched manually
in a Dell OptiPlex 755 computer with a clean installation of 32-bit Windows 7
Ultimate. The objective of the dynamic analysis was to collect behavioral-based
features (i.e., power consumption, network traffic, and system logs), while running
different malware and non-malicious applications on a general-purpose computer.
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The instrumentation used in our experiments to collect the power consumption
data was a DAQ, Model Number: USB-1608G Series [20]. The DAQ was attached
to the experimental machine through a 24-pin ATX-extender cable. The 24-pin
male connector from the ATX-extender cable was attached to the motherboard,
while the 24-pin female connector was attached to the PSU. Eight DC power chan-
nels—four voltage channels and four corresponding current channels were moni-
tored (+3.3V rails, the +5V rails, the +12V rails on the motherboard and the
+12V rails on the CPU). To collect precise power measurements, we developed a
program that directly accessed the DAQ to read the power consumption data and
stored them on a separate machine, used as data repository. A detailed description
about the hardware configuration used to collect the power consumption data can
be found in Chapter 4 and in our technical report [172].
We also used Wireshark [42], which ran on the data collection repository ma-
chine, to collect the network traffic data. In the case of the system logs, several
software applications (i.e., Event Viewer [208], RegFsNotify [112], Logstash [37],
and CaptureBAT) were evaluated.
Event Viewer [208] is a tool that allows the user to monitor the events that
occurred in the system, it maintains system logs about programs, security, and
system events on the computer, can be used to view and manage the system logs
and to gather specific information (e.g., hardware and software problems) [208].
Because the recorded events did not included the milliseconds on their timestamps,
this tool was discarded. Note that precise timestamps are essential since we are
interested in correlating the system logs with the power consumption and the
network traffic data.
Similarly, RegFsNotify [112] detects the changes that occurred in the Windows
Registry and file system in real time, but since no timestamp was recorded for
the collected events it was discarded. On the other hand, Logstash [37] (an open
source server-side tool for managing events and logs) was also discarded because
by having a client-server architecture additional software is required to run on
the background of the operating system (OS), which causes additional noisiness
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in the power consumption data. Finally, we evaluated CaptureBAT [263, 32], a
lightweight open source tool that logs the changes that occurs in the OS when an
application is running. This tool allows to record changes that occur in the file
system, Registry, and system processes. The file system monitor captures system
details such as when an event occurs, the type of event (i.e., read and write), and
the name of the process that triggered that particular event. The Registry monitor
reports the time with a resolution in milliseconds, the process that triggered the
registry event, the path to the key where the action occurred, and the type of action
that was performed on the key (i.e., created and deleted). The process monitor
pays attention to the creation and destruction of processes but does not report on
the running processes. It captures the time, whether the process was created or
terminated, and the file name that represents that particular process. This tool
was chosen among the other tools, because it has an exclusion list mechanism that
allows to omit noise that occurs naturally in the system. Moreover, this tool has
also been recommended for conducting dynamic malware analysis [143] and has
been used by previous works for rootkit detection [273] and for malware analysis
in memory forensics [284].
To account for the randomness of different Windows OS background processes,
each malware and non-malicious software application was executed three times.
Each run lasted for thirty minutes. Other works that used behavioral charac-
teristics for malware detection have executed the malware in a controlled sand-
box environment for one minute and a half [178], two minutes [251], five min-
utes [95, 77, 303, 99] and twenty minutes [114]. We decided to run our malware
samples for thirty minutes because for these specific malware examples this was
sufficient time for them to perform malevolent actions. Note that for each thirty
minutes run, we collected one .csv file with the power consumption data, one .pcap
file with the network traffic data, and one text file (.txt) with the system log data.
Chapter 5. Experimental Set-up & Data Collection 61
5.2.2 Code-based Static Data Collection
Static data can be collected without executing the portable executable file. Specif-
ically, the portable executable files has to be decompiled first. To decom-
pile Windows executables, disassembler and memory dumper tools can be used.
Some examples of tools commonly used to disassemble Windows executables are:
IDAPro [35], OllyDbg [38], ExifTool [152], and PE Explorer [51]. From these
tools, we used a disassembler tool called PE Explorer [51]. PE Explorer is an
integrated collection of tools that provide a framework for working with several
executable formats that run on Windows 32-bit platforms. After unpacking the
executable file, information such as headers, data directories, and dynamic linked
libraries (DLL) dependencies were collected from each malicious and non-malicious
software application.
5.3 Malicious and Non-malicious Applications
5.3.1 Malicious Software Selection
Malware examples were obtained from two malware repositories: (1) Con-
tagio (http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/) and (2) VirusShare (https://
virusshare.com/). To download the malware examples from the former website
(Contagio), no account was needed. However, in the case of the latter (virusShare),
we had to contact the website administrator and request access to the malicious
software. Table 5.1 lists the fifty one malware examples chosen for our experiments.
Note that those malware examples shown in bold in Table 5.1 are variants from
another malware that was also chosen for our experiments. For example, Carberp
V1 is a variant of Carberp and so on.
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Table 5.1: Malicious applications chosen for the experiments
# Malware Examples
1 Alureon
2 Avatar
3 Bangat
4 Biscuit
5 Carberp
6 Carberp V1
7 Citadel-Atmos
8 Cookiebag
9 CryptoLocker
10 CryptoLocker V1
11 Dairy
12 DarkMegi
13 Dexter
14 Emotet-K
15 Emotet-Conficker trojan
16 Filecoder
17 Greencat
18 Kovter-Zcryptor
19 Locky
20 MaxRootkit
21 Miniasp
22 Necurs
23 Newsreel
24 Pihar
25 Crisis
26 Rustock
# Malware Examples
27 Satan
28 Satan V1
29 Satan V2
30 Sirefef
31 Tabsgsql
32 Tarsip-Eclipse
33 Tarsip-Moon
34 Teerac-A
35 Tescrypt-A
36 Tescrypt-A V1
37 Tescrypt-D
38 Tescrypt-J
39 Warp
40 Web-C2-AUSOV
41 Web-C2-BOLID
42 Web-C2-CSON
43 Web-C2-DIV
44 Web-C2-HEAD
45 Web-C2-KT3
46 Web-C2-QBP
47 Web-C2-RAVE
48 Xpaj
49 Zbot
50 Zbot V1
51 Zbot V2
Each malicious software was executed in a virtual machine to ensure that it
was not corrupted and that it was functional for the Windows OS. We also used
a malware analysis service [26] to generate a behavioral report for each malicious
file. These behavioral reports were used to ensure the malware chosen for our
experiments was entirely removed from the hard disk drive after formatting the
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experimental machine using the Clonezilla tool.
Malware was executed manually to infect the experimental machine. We used
great care to allow malware to behave as intended. For each malware example,
we ensured that it was active by monitoring the network traffic and by observing
events such as files being encrypted, pop-ups with adult content, etc. The malware
selected for our experiments have traits of of viruses (e.g., Dexter [23]), worms
(e.g., Gamarue [22]), backdoors (e.g., Greencat [25]), rootkits (e.g., Alureon [294]),
and ransomware (e.g., Locky [49]). Different types of malware were used in our
experiments to have a representative, diverse malware sample. Distinguishing
among different malware types and/or malware families are beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
5.3.2 Non-malicious Software Selection
We used different types of non-malicious applications (some network intensive,
other CPU and memory usage intensive). We launched each non-malicious software
manually and ensured that it was provided with adequate inputs/workloads. For
example, we used Firefox [46] to navigate the Internet which generated network
traffic while IntelBurnTest [48] and HeavyLoad [47] were used to stress the CPU
of the experimental machine.
During the data collection process, six out of the twenty eight non-malicious
software applications (i.e., benchmark tools) were discarded because the duration
of the benchmarking test was less than a minute. Therefore, the remaining twenty
two non-malicious applications were chosen for the data analysis. A list of the
twenty two non-malicious software applications is given in Table 5.2. Note that
the discarded non-malicious software applications are shown in bold.
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Table 5.2: Non-malicious applications chosen for the experiments
# Non-malicious Applications
1 Adobe Reader
2 ATTO-Disk
3 BlackHole-B1
4 BlackHole-B2
5 BlackHole-B3
6 CPUID-CPU-Z
7 CPUStress
8 Firefox
9 FurMark-CPUBurner
10 GeekBench
11 HeavyLoad-StressCPU
12 HeavyLoad-StressMemory
13 HeavyLoad-TreeSize
14 HeavyLoad-WriteTempFile
# Non-malicious Applications
15 HyperPi
16 IntelBurnTest
17 KLite
18 MaxMemm
19 Notepad
20 Opera
21 ParticleFury
22 Spotify
23 StressMyPC
24 UserBenchmark
25 VLC
26 WebServerStress
27 Windows Media Player
28 XtremeBenchmark
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Chapter 6
Data Pre-processing & Feature
Extraction
This chapter explains the data pre-processing and how the dynamic behavioral-
based and code-based static features were extracted for the malicious and non-
malicious software applications.
6.1 Dynamic Behavioral-based Features
Dynamic methods require the execution of a given malware example, typically
in a sandbox environment [305, 275], and extract behavioral-based features that
represent the actions performed by the malware. Although the usage of dynamic
behavioral-based features is more costly, they are more resilient to obfuscation
because they extract behavior actions performed by the malware, rather than
binary code patterns. Therefore, using dynamic behavioral-based features is suit-
able for detecting new malware examples and variants of existing malware. In
this dissertation, the extracted dynamic behavioral-based features are divided into
three categories: (1) power-based features, (2) network traffic-based features, and
(3) system logs-based features. A total of three hundred and forty five dynamic
behavioral-based features (i.e., one hundred and thirty two power-based features,
ten system logs-based features, and two hundred and three network traffic-based
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features) were extracted.
After the data was collected, the power consumption, system logs, and the
network traffic data were pre-processed. To extract the desired behavioral features
from the power consumption, system logs, and network traffic data, we developed
our own Python script. With respect to the system logs and network traffic data,
each .txt file and .pcap file were converted to the .csv format for further analysis.
In the case of the power consumption data, a data conversion was not necessary
because the data was already in the .csv format. Furthermore, we developed
another Python script to calculate the autocorrelation function (ACF) for the
power consumption and network traffic data. In the case of the system logs, we
could not calculate the autocorrelation function because CaptureBAT collects only
the changes that occurs in the system after the execution of the malicious and non-
malicious software. Meaning there was not a specific time interval when collecting
the system logs, unlike with the power consumption and network traffic data.
The autocorrelation function is the coefficient of correlation between
two values in a time series [43]. Informally, autocorrelation can be de-
fined as the similarity between observations as a function of the time
lag between them. The ACF for a time series yt can be defined as:
Corr(yt, yt-k), k = 1, 2, ... n
where k refers to the time gap being considered as the lag. A lag whose k = 1
refers that the autocorrelation between the values is one time period apart. The
analysis of autocorrelation is helpful for finding repeating patterns, such as the
presence of a periodic signal obscured by noise. In our Python script we calculated
the autocorrelation function for different lags (i.e., when k = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and
50).
6.1.1 Power Consumption
Power consumption data was pre-processed by multiplying the voltage and current
for each of the monitored voltage rails to obtain the power consumption in Watts.
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To this end, we used a bash script that multiplies the current and voltage for each
of the monitored voltage rails. The extracted power-based features are given in
Table 6.1. Note that for the autocorrelation-based features in Tables 6.1 and 6.2,
if k = n, we would have a total of n values for k. For example, if k = 5, we have 5
values that were used as an autocorrelation-based feature. This is why we have a
total of 125 autocorrelation-based features (5 + 10 + 15 + 20 + 25 + 50 = 125) for
each modality (i.e., power consumption and network traffic data).
Table 6.1: List of extracted power-based features
Feature name Description
PwrMinimum Minimum power measurement
PwrMaximum Largest power measurement
PwrMean Average power measurement
PwrMedian Median power measurement
PwrVariance Variance power measurement
PwrSkewness Skewness power measurement
PwrKurtosis Kurtosis power measurement
AC Pwr 5 Autocorrelation values for k = 5
AC Pwr 10 Autocorrelation values for k = 10
AC Pwr 15 Autocorrelation values for k = 15
AC Pwr 20 Autocorrelation values for k = 20
AC Pwr 25 Autocorrelation values for k = 25
AC Pwr 50 Autocorrelation values for k = 50
6.1.2 Network Traffic
Analyzing network traffic data helps us to understand about what is happening on
the network. Network traffic-based features are convenient for malware detection,
since unusual amount of traffic in a network is a possible sign of a cyber-attack. In
this dissertation, the extracted network traffic-based features can be divided into
two categories: (1) commonly used network traffic-based features (e.g., number
of received packets, number of unique source IP address, etc.); and (2) network
flows-based features. The extracted commonly used network traffic-based features
are listed in Table 6.2, while the extracted network flows-based features with their
corresponding aggregation levels are given in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.2: List of extracted commonly used network traffic-based features
Feature name Description
Packets # of received packets
PktsLength Packets length in bytes
UniqueSourceIP IP address of the device sending the packet
UniqueDestIP IP address of the device receiving the packet
LLMNR # of packets related to LLMNR protocol
UDP # of UDP protocol packets
ARP # of ARP protocol packets
BROWSER # of BROWSER service packets
NBNS # of NBNS service packets
DHCP # of DHCP protocol packets
DHCPV6 # of DHCPV6 protocol packets
DNS # of DNS protocol packets
HTTP # of HTTP protocol packets
ICMP # of ICMP protocol packets
ICMPV6 # of ICMPV6 protocol packets
IGMPV3 # of IGMPV3 protocol packets
SSDP # of SSDP protocol packets
TCP # of TCP protocol packets
AC Ntwk 5 Autocorrelation values for k = 5
AC Ntwk 10 Autocorrelation values for k = 10
AC Ntwk 15 Autocorrelation values for k = 15
AC Ntwk 20 Autocorrelation values for k = 20
AC Ntwk 25 Autocorrelation values for k = 25
AC Ntwk 50 Autocorrelation values for k = 50
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Table 6.3: List of extracted network flows-based features
Feature name Description Aggregation levels
Flows # of flows None
Duration Time communication lasted Max, Avg
L4ProtoUDP # of flows related to UDP None
L4protoIGMP # of flows related to IGMP None
L4ProtoTCP # of flows related to TCP None
L4ProtoICMP # of flows related to ICMP None
PktsSent # of transmitted packets Sum, Max, Avg
PktsRcvd # of received packets Sum, Max, Avg
BytesSnt # of transmitted bytes Sum, Min, Max, Avg
BytesRcvd # of received bytes Sum, Max, Avg
MinPktSize Minimum layer 3 packet size Min
MaxPktSize Maximum layer 3 packet size Max
AvgPktSize Average packet load ratio Avg, Median
StdPktSz Standard deviation packet load ratio Std
Pktps Packets sent per second Max, Avg
Bytps Bytes sent per second Max, Avg
PktAsm Packet stream asymmetry Min, Avg
BytAsm Byte stream asymmetry Min, Avg
TcpPSeqCnt TCP packet sequence count Max, Avg
TcpSeqSntBytes TCP sent sequence diff bytes Max, Avg
TcpSeqFaultCnt TCP sequence # fault count Max, Avg
TcpPAckCnt TCP packet ack count Max, Avg
TcpFlLAcRcByt TCP flawless ack received bytes Max, Avg
TcpAckFaultCnt TCP ack # fault count Max, Avg
TcpInitWinSz TCP initial window size Max, Avg
TcpAveWinSz TCP average window size Avg, Median
TcpWinSzDwCn TCP window size change down count Max, Avg
TcpWiSzUpCnt TCP window size change down count Max, Avg
TcpWiSzChDiCn TCP window size direction change count Max, Avg
FlowDirA Flows direction is clnt to srvr None
FlowDirB Flows direction is srvr to clnt None
AvgIAT Average of IAT Avg, Median
StdIAT Standard deviation of IAT Std
Literature shows several definitions for network flows [104, 105, 198].
In this dissertation we follow the definition given by Claise [105], which
describes a network flow as “a set of IP packets passing an observa-
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tion point in the network during a certain time interval, such that all
packets belonging to a particular flow have a set of common proper-
ties”. Specifically, a network flow is defined using the following 5-tuple:
(ip src, ip dest, port src, port dst, and proto)
where ip src refers to the source IP address, ip dest refers to the destination IP
address, port src refers to the source port number, port dst refers to the destination
port number, and proto refers to the used protocol.
There exists a variety of tools that can be used to extract network flows from
a .pcap file. Some examples of these tools are FlowScan [2, 232], NetFlow [104],
NetViewer [183], Netpy [130], Softflowd [7], TCPflow [3], SpliCap [5], and Trana-
lyzer [52], which extends Cisco NetFlow’s [104] functionality. In this dissertation
we used Tranalyzer [52, 96], a lightweight unidirectional flow exporter that collects
packet information with common characteristics, such as IP addresses and port
numbers, to obtain the network flows. This tool was chosen over the others for
three reasons: (1) It is an extension of NetFlow [104] which has been widely used
by the research community as a flow exporter (aggregates packets into flows and
export flow records) and as a flow collector (storage and pre-process flow data); (2)
It supports features that can be categorized into groups (e.g., time, inter-arrival,
packets, etc.); (3) It has been used by previous works [148, 149] for detection of
botnets.
Since multiple flows (e.g., > 100) were generated for each individual .pcap file,
we performed aggregation of the network flow-based features to achieve our final
network flows-based features. Aggregation is commonly used to get additional
information about particular groups based on specific characteristics. In addition,
it also helps to achieve a coarser granularity in the data.
6.1.3 System logs
System logs or syslogs are files that contain events that are logged by compo-
nents from the OS. Extracting system logs-based features is useful because they
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contain information about the software, hardware, system processes and system
components as well as information, such as error and warning events related to
the computer OS. The extracted system logs-based features (given in Table 6.4)
were based on the changes that occurred in the file system, Registry, and system
processes while the malicious and non-malicious software were executed.
Table 6.4: List of extracted system logs-based features
Feature name Description
Changes # of changes that occurred in the system
FileChgs # of changes in the file system
RegistryChgs # of changes in the Registry
ProcessesChgs # of changes in the process manager
FlsWrite # of written files
FlsDelete # of deleted files
CreatedPrcs # of created processes
TerminatedPrcs # of terminated processes
SetValueKeyChgs # of times the value entry under the open key was replaced/created
DelValueKeyChgs # of times a method deleted a value entry under the open key
6.2 Code-based Static Features
Common malware analysis techniques initiate by conducting static analysis. Static
analysis describes the process of analyzing the code or structure of a program to
determine what it does without the need of executing it. These methods can be
applied to detect known malware with high accuracy and speed, but they are
susceptible to code obfuscation which is a common practice of malware creators.
In order to conduct static malware analysis, the portable executable (PE) file
format is used. A PE file consist of a number of headers and sections that tell the
dynamic linker how to map the file into memory, while the PE file format is a data
structure that encapsulates the information necessary for the Windows OS loader
to manage the wrapped executable code [271]. Typically, every file with executable
code that is loaded by the Windows OS is in the PE file format. The structure of
these files begin with a header that includes information about the code, the type
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of application and dynamic library references for linking, application programming
interface (API), export and import tables, resource management data and thread-
local storage (TLS) data.
In this dissertation, we extracted the code-based static features using the PE
Explorer tool [51]. The extracted code-based static features were in the .txt format,
so we converted them to the .csv format for further analysis. To pre-process the
data, we used a bash script to remove punctuation marks (i.e., the apostrophes
and semicolons) and redundant information (i.e., the name of the computer used
to collect the data and the timestamp in which the file was created).
After the data pre-processing, we developed our own Python script to extract
the code-based static features. The extracted code-based static features can be
divided into three categories: (1) headers-based features, (2) data directories-based
features, and (3) DLL dependencies-based features. Since some of our code-based
static features were in hexadecimal, we developed another Python script to convert
these hexadecimal values to decimal before the data analysis. A total of forty
eight code-based static features (i.e., fourteen header-based features, eight data
directories-based features, and twenty six DLL dependencies-based features) were
extracted.
The extracted headers-based features contains information about the number
of sections, the size of the stack and heap, and so on. This type of information is
of great value to the malware analyst since it can be obtained easily without the
need of executing the malicious file [271]. A list of the extracted headers-based
features is given in Table 6.5.
Data directories indicates how a specific section body’s data is structured on
the executable file. The data directories contain references to various tables (e.g.,
import, export, resource, etc.). These references (if appropriately analyzed) can
provide valuable insight to malware analysts, since they provide a summary of the
contents of the PE file [265]. Specifically, each data directory structure specifies
the size and relative virtual address of the directory. The data directories contain
information such as the resources, debugging information, base relocations and
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other OS specific data. Table 6.6 lists the extracted data directories-based features.
Table 6.5: List of extracted headers-based features
Feature name Description
Sections Size of the section table
Magic Integer identifying the sate of the image file
CodeSz Size of the executable code
InitializedDataSz Size of the initialized data
EntryPointAddr Address of entry point when an executable file is loaded into memory
BaseOfCode Offset of the executable code
BaseOfData Offset of the initialized data
ImageSz Amount of memory the image file will need
HeaderSz Length of all headers including the data directories and the section headers
StackReserveSz Stack commit size
StackCommitSz Size of initially committed stack
HeapReserveSz Size of the local heap space reserve
HeapCommitSz Size of the committed heap
DataDirectories # of valid entries in the data directories
Table 6.6: List of extracted data directories-based features
Feature name Description
ExportTblSz Directory of the exported symbols
ImportTblSz Directory of the imported symbols
ResourceTblSz Directory of the resources
RelocationTblSz Directory of the base relocation table
TLSTblSz Directory of the Thread Local Storage (TLS)
LoadConfigTblSz Directory of the load configuration
IAT-TblSz Directory of the Import Address Table (IAT)
DelayImportDescriptors Address and size of the delay import descriptor
A program’s DLL contain valuable information about its functionality [271].
Using the Dependency Scanner option from the PE Explorer tool, we extracted
the DLL dependencies for each malicious and non-malicious software application.
Software dependencies are modules or pieces of code that are required by an appli-
cation to load and run correctly. Specifically, the DLL dependencies-based features
consists from the information extracted from the program’s libraries and functions.
The extracted DLL dependencies-based features are given in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.7: List of extracted DLL dependencies-based features
Feature name Description
Parameters # of unique function call parameters
kernel32 # of kernel32.dll
advapi32 # of advapi32.dll
gdi32 # of gdi32.dll
ole32 # of ole32.dll
user32 # of user32.dll
glu32 # of glu32.dll
opengl32 # of opengl32.dll
shell32 # of shell32.dll
comctl32 # of comctl32.dll
comdlg32 # of comdlg32.dll
oleaut32 # of oleaut32.dll
version # of version.dll
winspool # of winspool.drv
wininet # of wininet.dll
wintrust # of wintrust.dll
mpr # of mpr.dll
urlmon # of urlmon.dll
rasapi32 # of rasapi32.dll
msimg32 # of msimg32.dll
imm32 # of imm32.dll
winmm # of winmm.dll
lz32 # of lz32.dll
indexMax Maximum # of the function in the ordinal export table
indexMin Minimum # of the function in the ordinal export table
indexAvg Average # of the function in the ordinal export table
Some of these DLL dependencies-based features are known to be useful for
distinguishing malware among non-malicious software. For example, the work by
Kolosnjaji et al. [190] stated that functions imported from kernel32.dll entail that
malware opens and manipulates processes. Similarly, functions imported from
the shell32.dll suggests that malware launches other programs. In addition, the
work by Salehi et al. [251] mentioned the user32.dll, kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, and
wininet.dll as some of the most important DLLs to consider for malware detection.
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Chapter 7
Machine Learning Algorithms &
Performance Metrics
This chapter explains the conducted experiments to classify between malicious
and non-malicious software. Furthermore, it provides a description of the super-
vised machine learning algorithms and performance metrics used for the experi-
ments in Chapters 8, 9, and 10.
7.1 Background on Standard Machine Learning
Algorithms
Through our work we used standard supervised machine learning algorithms for
malware and non-malicious software classification. We used ten supervised ma-
chine learning algorithms (i.e., J48, Random Forest, Random Tree, OneR, Naive
Bayes, JRip, PART, Multilayer Perceptron, SMO, and Decision Table) of different
types, with a goal to identify the best performing learner(s). Table 7.1 lists the
names and types of the ten learners used in this work.
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Table 7.1: Name and type of each learner used for this work
Learner Type
J48 [238] Tree
Random Forest (RF) [90] Ensemble Tree
Random Tree [69] Tree
One R [161] Rule
Naive Bayes (NB) [173] Bayes Theorem
JRip [110] Rule
PART [138] Rule + Tree
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) [218] Artificial Neural Network
SMO [231] Support Vector Machine
Decision Table [187] Rule
The J48 learner is an open source Java implementation of the C4.5 decision tree
algorithm developed by Ross Quinlan [238]. Random Forest is an ensemble learn-
ing method that operates by constructing a multitude of decision trees and outputs
the average prediction of the individual trees [90]. Random trees is a collection
(ensemble) of tree predictors that is called forest. The classification works as fol-
lows: the random trees classifier takes the input feature vector, classifies it with
every tree in the forest, and outputs the class label that received the majority of
“votes” [174]. One R (1R) is a simple classification algorithm that ranks attributes
according to error rate (on the training set) by treating all numerically-valued at-
tributes as continuous and using a straightforward method to divide the range
of values into several disjoint intervals [161]. Naive Bayes is an algorithm based
on the Bayesian theorem in which numeric estimator precision values are chosen
based on analysis of the training data [173]. JRip is a direct rule learner that
outputs learned knowledge as rules by using a separate and-conquer technique to
identify rules covering instances from a specific class, separate them out, and con-
tinue on the remaining instances [110]. PART is a hybrid rule-and-tree algorithm
that builds a partial C4.5 decision tree in each iteration and makes the “best” leaf
into a rule [138]. MLP is a class of feed forward artificial neural network (ANN)
that identify non-linear decision boundaries of data by including many perceptrons
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(i.e., nodes) that are organized into multiple layers in the network [218]. SMO is
a type of support vector machine (SVM) that implements the sequential minimal
optimization algorithm for the training of the support vector classifier [231]. Deci-
sion Table builds a decision table majority classifier by evaluating feature subsets
using best-first search and can also use cross-validation for evaluation [187]. We
used the implementations of these ten learners provided in Weka [150].
Besides the classification algorithms, we also used a feature selection method
on all features (i.e., the combined set of power-based, network traffic-based, system
logs-based, and code-based static features). Specifically, we used a feature selection
method called information gain [180], which ranks the features from the most
descriptive to the least descriptive using information gain as a measure. All features
by their ranking order can be found in Appendix A.
7.2 Performance Metrics
To evaluate the supervised machine learning algorithms performance, we used
several metrics computed from the confusion matrix:
Actual:
Non-malicious
Actual:
Malware
Predicted:
Non-malicious
TN FN
Predicted:
Malware
FP TP
where TN, FN, FP, and TP refer to the numbers of true negatives, false nega-
tives, false positives, and true positives, respectively. We computed the following
performance metrics that assess different aspects of the classification:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(7.1)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(7.2)
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Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(7.3)
False Positive Rate (FPR) =
FP
FP + TN
(7.4)
F-score =
2 · Precision ·Recall
Precision+Recall
(7.5)
G-score =
2 ·Recall · (1− FPR)
Recall + (1− FPR) (7.6)
The accuracy (see Equation (7.1)) provides the percentage of instances that
were detected correctly. The Recall, defined by Equation (7.2), is the ratio of
detected malware to all malware instances. Precision (see Equation (7.3)) deter-
mines the fraction of instances correctly classified as malware out of all instances
classified as malware. False Positive Rate (FPR), defined by Equation (7.4), is
the ratio of non-malicious software applications misclassified as malware to the
number of all non-malicious applications. Values of all metrics are in the interval
[0, 1]. Ideally, a good classifier would have Accuracy, Recall, and Precision of 1
and FPR of 0.
In addition to these metrics, we used two composite metrics: F-score and G-
score. The F-score, defined by Equation (7.5), is the harmonic mean of the Recall
and Precision. Similarly, G-score, given by Equation (7.6), is the harmonic mean
of Recall and (1 − FPR). Larger values of F-score and G-score correspond to
better learner performance. An ideal learner would have both F-score and G-score
of 1.
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Chapter 8
Malware Detection Using Power
& Network Traffic Data
In this Chapter we discuss using power consumption and network traffic data
for malware detection. The results in this Chapter will be presented at the Inter-
national Conference on Data Intelligence and Security (ICDIS) in June 2019 [156].
8.1 Approach & Contributions
We used the data collected from our experimental set-up (See Chapter 5) to ex-
tract the features. First, both the power consumption and network traffic data
of malware and non-malicious software were pre-processed. For the power data,
we multiplied the voltage and current for each of the four monitored DC rails to
obtain the power consumption in Watts. In the case of the network traffic data,
each .pcap file was exported as a .csv file.
Using these features, we conducted a series of machine learning experiments for
malware detection, that is, used classification to attribute each run to a malware or
non-malicious software. Specifically, we experimented with ten supervised machine
learning algorithms (i.e., J48, Random Forest, Random Tree, OneR, Naive Bayes,
JRip, PART, Multilayer Perceptron, SMO, and Decision Table) by using their
implementations provided in Weka [150]. For each learner, we used ten-fold cross
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validation, using nine folds of the labeled malware and non-malicious software
instances for training and the tenth fold (of unseen) malware and non-malicious
instances for testing. This was repeated ten times, each time using a different fold
for testing. The learners performance was evaluated using the performance metrics
described in Chapter 7.
Specifically, we explore the following research questions:
RQ1: Do some learners perform consistently better than other using power-based
and/or network traffic-based features?
RQ2: Which of the monitored voltage rails is the best predictor for malware detec-
tion on a general-purpose computer?
RQ3: Does the combination of power-based features and network traffic-based fea-
tures provide better malware detection performance than each set of features
individually?
RQ4: What is the smallest number of features that can be used for malware detec-
tion without performance degradation?
The contributions of the research work presented in this Chapter are as follows:
• Using our testbed [171], we conducted experiments to collect power con-
sumption and network traffic data when running samples of malware and
non-malicious software applications. Power data was collected by using a
Data Acquisition System (DAQ) which measured the power consumption
from four different voltage rails, while the network traffic data was collected
using Wireshark [42].
• The study is focused on detecting real malware using the extracted dynamic
behavioral features (both power-based and network traffic-based) and super-
vised machine learning algorithms, which has not been done by any of the
previous works.
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• We ran a large number of machine learning experiments, which allowed us
to identify the best performing learner, DC voltage rails that led to the best
malware detection performance, and the subset of features that are the best
predictors for malware detection. Even more, the comparison of malware
detection performance was done using a comprehensive set of metrics that
reflect different aspects of the quality of malware detection.
8.2 Results
8.2.1 RQ1: Learners Analysis Performance
To answer RQ1, we explored which learners perform consistently better than others
for power-based and/or commonly used network traffic-based features. We used
ten supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e., J48, Random Forest, Random
Tree, OneR, Naive Bayes, JRip, PART, Multilayer Perceptron, SMO, and Decision
Table). Learners performance were evaluated in terms of the mean F-score and
G-score over the ten folds, using only the power-based features (given in Table 6.1)
extracted from the +12V CPU rails and for using only commonly used network
traffic-based features (given in Table 6.2). Note that for this machine learning
experiment we did not used the autocorrelation-based features nor the network
flows-based features. Figure 8.1 shows the learners performance for the power-
based features, while Figure 8.2 shows the learners performance for the commonly
used network traffic-based features. Also, note that in Figure 8.2 the mean values
for F-score and G-score of Naive Bayes were very close (i.e., 0.641 and 0.642,
respectively), which explains why only the G-score is shown.
Random Forest had the highest F-score for both the power-based features and
commonly used network traffic-based features (0.971 and 0.946, respectively). Ran-
dom Tree, led to the same F-score as Random Forest and had the highest G-score
(0.949) when using only power-based features, while J48 had the highest G-score
when using only the commonly used network traffic-based features (0.890). Naive
Chapter 8. Malware Detection Using Power & Network Traffic Data 82
Bayes and SMO performed significantly worse than the other learners, both when
using only power-based features and when using only commonly used network
traffic-based features. Since Random Forest had the best F-scores and close to
the best G-scores for both power-based and commonly used network traffic-based
features, we use it as a learner of choice in the rest of Chapter 8.
Figure 8.1: Mean F-score & mean G-score for each learner using only power-based
features for the +12V CPU rails
Figure 8.2: Mean F-score & mean G-score for each learner using only commonly
used network traffic-based features
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8.2.2 RQ2: Voltage Rail Analysis
As described in Chapter 5, four DC voltage channels and four corresponding cur-
rent channels were monitored. To address RQ2, we evaluated the performance
using only the power-based features extracted from power data collected on each
of the monitored voltage rails, using the Random Forest classifier. The box plots
of the performance metrics, for each of the voltage rails, are shown in Figure 8.3.
Note that in Figure 8.3 the performance range is from 0.70 to 1 and instead of
FPR we show (1-FPR). Therefore, the results for all performance metrics shown
in Figure 8.3 are better when they are closer to 1.
Figure 8.3: Box plots of the Random Forest performance metrics for each of the
monitored voltage rails
With respect to all performance metrics, as can be seen in Figure 8.3, the
features extracted from the +12V CPU rails led to the best classification results,
followed by the +3.3V rails, +5V rails, and +12V rails of the motherboard. The
G-scores were 0.945, 0.912, 0.873, and 0.857, respectively. Based on these results
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we use the power-based features extracted from the +12V CPU rails in the rest of
Chapter 8.
8.2.3 RQ3: Feature Level Fusion Using Power & Network
Traffic Data
To answer RQ3, we explored if the combination of power-based features and net-
work traffic-based features (i.e., commonly used network traffic-based features) pro-
vide better malware detection performance than each set of features individually.
We first used the power-based features and commonly used network traffic-based
features separately, then combined into one feature vector. Results presented in
Figure 8.4 show that using only power-based features provided significantly better
performance than using only commonly used network traffic-based features, with
respect to all performance metrics.
Figure 8.4: Box plots of Random Forest performance using only power-based fea-
tures from +12V CPU rails, only commonly used network traffic-based features,
and combined set of features
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Specifically, using only power-based features achieved mean G-score of 0.945
and mean F-score of 0.971, while when using only commonly used network traffic-
based features led to mean G-score of 0.891 and mean F-score of 0.946. Note that
when using only commonly used network traffic-based features the FPR was con-
siderably higher than when using only power-based features (i.e., 0.169 compared
to 0.084).
The performance was the best when the combined set of power-based and com-
monly used network traffic-based features were used. Adding the commonly used
network traffic-based features to the power-based features noticeably improved
the malware detection performance (i.e., the mean G-score improved from 0.945 to
0.964 and the mean F-score improved from 0.971 to 0.983). Furthermore, the com-
bined set of features (as in the case of using only power-based features) exhibited
much smaller variability of the performance metrics over the 10 fold cross-validation
runs than when only commonly used network traffic-based features were used.
We also analyzed the extracted features separately for the two groups (i.e.,
malware and non-malicious applications). The basic statistics for the power-based
features and network traffic-based features are given in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, respec-
tively. We used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test to explore if the features of
the two groups (i.e., malware and non-malicious applications) differ. We used 5%
level of significance (i.e., α = 0.05). If for a specific feature the p-value is less than
α, it follows that there is a statistically significant difference of the values of that
feature for malware and non-malicious applications. Statistically significant refers
to the likelihood that the differences between the feature values for malware and
non-malicious applications are caused by something more than a random chance.
Results presented in Table 8.1 show that all power-based features are significantly
different for the malware and non-malicious software groups. As shown in Ta-
ble 8.2, most of the network-based features are also significantly different between
malware and non-malicious software groups. The only exceptions are the number
of packets related to the LLMNR, UDP, DHCP, and DHCPv6 protocols.
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Table 8.1: Basic statistics for power-based features
Non-malicious Malware Mann-Whitney
Power-based features Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD p-value
PwrMinimum 5.013 42.15 13.22 5.78 12.17 4.95 25.58 5.31 5.11 1.72 p < 2.2e−16
PwrMaximum 34.010 57.61 41.02 39.45 4.71 33.13 43.99 38.35 37.96 2.56 p < 0.001
PwrMean 6.11 51.13 23.76 24.73 14.25 5.63 28.96 6.69 5.83 3.16 p < 2.2e−16
PwrMedian 5.65 54.89 23.58 24.87 15.12 5.53 28.92 6.11 5.66 3.11 p < 2.2e−16
PwrVariance 0.07 97.83 23.66 13.01 27.28 0.30 66.56 11.94 1.76 18.67 0.0019
PwrSkewness −28.41 8.35 0.76 0.61 5.00 1.38 21.90 11.83 12.84 5.94 p < 2.2e−16
PwrKurtosis −1.58 841.33 32.20 7.65 102.67 −0.12 564.60 204.26 195.48 158.50 p < 2.2e−16
Table 8.2: Basic statistics for network traffic-based features
Non-malicious Malware Mann-Whitney
Network traffic-based features Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD p-value
Packets 5.91e2 2.97e5 2.52e4 3.22e3 5.75e4 1.51e3 2.22e5 7.97e3 3.46e3 2.65e4 p < 0.001
PktsLength 1.91e5 2.63e8 2.16e7 4.8e5 5.41e7 3.34e5 1.91e8 3.86e6 5.06e5 2.30e7 p < 0.052
UniqueSourceIP 6.00 35.00 9.07 6.00 5.91 6.00 53.00 9.75 7.00 8.55 0.0185
UniqueDestIP 14.00 49.00 17.55 14.00 7.10 14.00 571.00 32.39 15.00 65.58 p < 0.001
LLMNR 0.00 376.00 55.10 48.00 46.28 28.00 526.00 100.03 48.00 121.88 0.6195
UDP 0.00 142.00 110.49 120.00 32.73 94.00 1921.00 175.86 120.00 294.01 0.1821
ARP 56.00 707.00 538.23 581.00 154.63 131.00 659.00 489.39 535.00 136.37 p < 0.001
BROWSER 1.00 15.00 8.26 8.00 2.89 6.00 19.00 10.08 9.00 2.52 p < 0.001
NBNS 4.6e1 1.53e3 1.17e3 1.22e3 3.31e2 0.00 6.40e3 1.40e3 1.42e3 1.16e3 3.54e−2
DHCP 0.00 54.00 13.51 12.00 8.87 10.00 24.00 12.33 12.00 1.15 0.3299
DHCPV6 0.00 102.00 58.29 56.00 14.28 49.00 70.00 58.92 58.00 3.18 0.45
DNS 19.00 282.00 50.83 30.00 55.05 0.00 1.08e4 189.30 36.00 1.11e3 p < 0.001
HTTP 0.00 1.73e3 89.41 0.00 358.12 0.00 1.73e4 350.99 0.00 2246.15 0.04988
ICMP 0.00 21.00 16.58 18.00 5.07 13.00 656.00 41.75 18.00 79.22 p < 0.001
ICMPV6 0.00 61.00 36.12 40.00 11.71 30.00 56.00 43.87 41.00 5.25 p < 0.001
IGMPV3 0.00 61.00 36.01 39.00 11.70 30.00 56.00 43.86 41.00 5.33 p < 0.001
SSDP 12.00 1.13e3 887.36 969.00 260.35 360.00 1.5e3 909.18 913.00 90.32 p < 0.001
TCP 0.00 2.38e5 1.95e4 0.00 4.87e4 0.00 2.01e5 3.81e3 53.00 2.41e4 0.0019
•Note that in Table 8.2 some of the network traffic-based features (i.e., Packets,
PktsLength, NBNS, HTTP, SSDP, and TCP) were converted to scientific notation.
8.2.4 RQ4: Smallest Feature Set Without Performance
Degradation
To answer RQ4, we analyzed the smallest number of features that can be used
for malware detection using the information gain feature selection method [180].
To determine the smallest number of features that can be used for classification
without performance degradation we started building the model with the highest
ranked feature and included one feature at a time until reaching less than or equal
to 1% difference of the Recall compared to when all 25 features were used. Table 8.3
shows the features by their ranking order. Note that the features in gray are the
power-based features.
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The top eleven features ranked by information gain provided similar perfor-
mance as using all 25 features (i.e., Recall of 0.981). Five out of seven power-based
features were among the top eleven features.
Table 8.3: Power-based and commonly used network traffic-based features ranked
using information gain
Ranking Feature
1 PwrMedian
2 PwrSkewness
3 PwrAverage
4 PwrMinimum
5 PwrKurtosis
6 Packets
7 SSDP
8 NBNS
9 ARP
10 UDP
11 IGMPV3
12 PwrVariance
13 ICMPV6
14 TCP
15 PwrMaximum
16 PktsLength
17 LLMNR
18 ICMP
19 UniqueSourceIP
20 BROWSER
21 UniqueDestIP
22 DNS
23 DHCP
24 DHCPV6
25 HTTP
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8.3 Summary of Findings
The main findings of the work presented in this Chapter are as follows: (1) Random
Forest had the highest F-scores and close to the highest G-scores. (2) The power
data extracted from the +12V CPU rails led to significantly better performance
than power data from the other three voltage rails. (3) Using only power-based
features provided better performance than using only network traffic-based fea-
tures; using combined features led to the best malware detection performance. (4)
The top eleven features ranked by information gain provided same performance as
using all 25 features. Note that the proposed solution and the used features are
only repeatable in this type of environment, since the machine learning algorithms
may perform differently depending on the type of malware and used features.
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Chapter 9
Malware Detection using Network
Traffic & System Logs
This Chapter presents our findings when using network traffic data and system
logs to classify malware from non-malicious software. The results presented in
this Chapter has been published in the 18th IEEE International Symposium on
Network Computing and Applications (NCA) [171].
9.1 Approach & Contributions
In this Chapter, we conducted a series of machine learning experiments for malware
detection. The baseline feature vector was created by combining the system logs-
based features and the commonly used network traffic-based features. Then, we
added the network flows-based features to the baseline feature vector to study
their effect on the malware detection. Note that any feature (regardless of the
type) which had all instances equal to 0 was removed from the learning process.
For classification, we used four supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e.,
J48, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, and PART) of different types, with a goal to
identify the best performing learner(s). With respect to the malware detection
experiments, we used ten-fold cross validation, which consists of using nine folds
of the labeled malware and non-malicious software instances for training (i.e., 90%
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of the data) and the tenth fold (of unseen) malware and non-malicious instances for
testing. We also experimented with smaller training set sizes (i.e., 75%, 50%, and
25% of the data). The learners performance was evaluated using the performance
metrics described in Chapter 7.
Specifically, we explore the following research questions:
RQ1: Does the network flows-based features improve the performance of malware
detection? What is (are) the best performing learner(s)?
RQ2: What is the smallest number of features sufficient to successfully distinguish
malware from non-malicious software? What are the types of the best pre-
dictor features?
RQ3: How much data must be set aside for training in order to attain acceptable
detection results?
The contributions of the research work presented in this Chapter are as follow:
• Most of the previous works that have used network flows-based fea-
tures [124, 120, 98, 61, 316, 73, 289, 117, 125, 84, 308, 204, 148, 149] have done
classification of the network traffic, while our study is focused on classifying
the software running in a machine as malware and non-malicious software
using the extracted dynamic behavioral features (i.e., network traffic-based
features and system logs-based features).
• Feature selection methods were not commonly used by previous works on
malware detection, with an exception of [84]. Determining a small subset of
features that can provide predictions as good as when all features are used
has a practical usefulness and importance because it allows building more
efficient models.
• We experimented with different sizes of the training set (i.e., 90%, 75%, 50%,
and 25% of the data) and found that smaller training sets produced very
good classification results. Specifically, using 75% of the data for training
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has only slightly worse performance compared to when using 90% of the
data for training (which is the standard ten-fold cross validation approach).
Somewhat worse, but still very good classification performance was achieved
with as little as 25% of the data used for training. This aspect of our work
has a practical value because the manual labeling of the training set is a
tedious and time consuming process.
9.2 Results
9.2.1 RQ1: Network Flows-based Features Performance
To answer RQ1, we compared the learners performance when the baseline features
were used (see Figure 9.1) and when the network flows-based features were used
(see Figure 9.2). The baseline feature vector was created by combining the system
logs-based features (given in Table 6.4) and the commonly used network traffic-
based features (given in Table 6.2). Then, we added the network flows-based
features (given in Table 6.3) to the baseline feature vector to study their effect
on the malware detection. Note that the autocorrelation-based features were not
included in this experiment.
For classification, we used four supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e.,
J48, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, and PART) of different types, with a goal
to identify the best performing learner(s). Because low FPR indicates better
performance, 1−FPR is shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2. The range of performance
metrics for both Figures 9.1 and 9.2 is from 0.5 to 1. Note that since 1−FPR for
Naive Bayes was below 0.5, it is not shown in Figure 9.2.
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Figure 9.1: Box plots of the learners performance metrics for the baseline feature
vector
Figure 9.2: Box plots of the learners performance metrics for all features
In addition to box plots shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2, we used the basic statis-
tics (i.e, mean, median, variance, and interquartile range (IQR)) for the G-score
(given in Table 9.1) and F-score (shown in Table 9.2). Note that IQR is a mea-
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sure of statistical dispersion, being equal to the difference between 75th and 25th
percentiles.
Table 9.1: Basics Statistics of G-score
Baseline All Features
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR Mean Median Variance IQR
J48 0.886 0.888 3.12 · 10−4 0.014 0.941 0.941 1.21 · 10−4 0.013
RF 0.888 0.889 3.94 · 10−4 0.019 0.908 0.911 5.25 · 10−5 0.008
NB 0.738 0.740 5.23 · 10−5 0.019 0.545 0.550 2.17 · 10−4 0.029
PART 0.866 0.872 5.70 · 10−4 0.037 0.947 0.950 1.83 · 10−4 0.016
Table 9.2: Basic Statistics of F-score
Baseline All Features
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR Mean Median Variance IQR
J48 0.939 0.942 1.25 · 10−4 0.015 0.973 0.972 3.69 · 10−5 0.005
RF 0.951 0.951 6.10 · 10−5 0.008 0.965 0.965 7.40 · 10−6 0.002
NB 0.747 0.748 4.11 · 10−5 0.011 0.871 0.871 6.21 · 10−6 0.002
PART 0.923 0.924 1.97 · 10−4 0.018 0.972 0.973 5.78 · 10−5 0.011
In case of G-score, when network flows-based features were added to the base-
line feature vector, J48, Random Forest, and PART showed a significant improve-
ment of the mean and median G-score, as well as smaller variance and IQR. On
the other side, the Naive Bayes algorithm experienced degradation of the G-score
when all features were used. This was due to the increased FPR, which likely
was a result of the fact that this learner assumes that features are conditionally
independent from one another.
In the case of F-score, the performance of all learners was improved when using
all features compared to when the baseline feature vector was used, that is, they
had significantly higher mean and median F-scores and smaller variance and IQR.
Note that the F-score of the Naive Bayes algorithm had significantly smaller mean
and median values than the other three algorithms.
In summary, when all features were used for classification, J48 and PART were
the best performing learners. PART had sightly higher median G-score than J48
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(0.950 compared to 0.941), while they had similar median F-score values (0.973
and 0.972, respectively). Since J48 and PART were the best performing learners,
we used them as learners of choice in the rest of Chapter 9.
9.2.2 RQ2: Smallest Feature Set Without Performance
Degradation
To address RQ2, we used feature selection method on all features (i.e., the com-
bined set of baseline features and network flows-based features). Specifically, we
used a feature selection method called information gain [180], which ranks the fea-
tures from the most descriptive to the least descriptive using the information gain
as a measure.
To determine the smallest number of features that can be used for malware
detection without performance degradation we used the following approach. We
started building the model with the highest ranked feature and included one feature
at a time until reaching less than or equal to 1% difference of the Recall compared
to when all 88 features were used. Table 9.3 shows all features by their ranking
order. Note that in Table 9.3 the network flows-based features are shown in gray,
while the system logs-based features are shown in bold.
For J48, the top five features ranked by information gain provided similar
performance as when using all 88 features. Four out of the five features were
network flows-based features. In the case of PART, the first fourteen features
ranked by information gain led to similar performance as when using all 88 features.
Six out of the fourteen features were network flows-based features.
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Table 9.3: Network traffic-based and system logs-based features ranked using in-
formation gain
Rank Feature
1 BytesSntMax
2 PktsSentSum
3 PktsSentMax
4 Packets
5 BytesSntSum
6 L4ProtoIGMP
7 SSDP
8 NBNS
9 ARP
10 UDP
11 BytesSntAvg
12 IGMPV3
13 ICMPV6
14 TCP
15 PktsRcvdSum
16 DurationAvg
17 BytesTransferred
18 AvgPktSizeAvg
19 TcpAckFaultCntMax
20 PktsSentAvg
21 LLMNR
22 BytesRcvdSum
23 ICMP
24 UniqueSourceIP
25 TcpAckFaultCntAvg
26 PktsRcvdMax
27 FlowDirA
28 BytesRcvdMax
29 BROWSER
30 TcpInitWinSzAvg
31 L4ProtoTCP
32 Flows
33 AvgPktSizeMedian
34 TcpInitWinSzMax
35 BytpsAvg
36 BytesRcvdAvg
37 BytesSntMin
38 PktsRcvdAvg
39 StdPktSzStd
40 TcpFlLAcRcBytAvg
41 RegistryChgs
42 SetValueKeyChgs
43 UniqueDestIP
44 TcpPSeqCntMax
Rank Feature
45 TcpWinSzDwnCntMax
46 TcpPAckCntMax
47 FlowDirB
48 TcpFlLAcRcBytMax
49 TcpAveWinSzAvg
50 MinPktSizeMin
51 DNS
52 PktpsMax
53 BytAsmAvg
54 TcpWinSzUpCntMax
55 FileChgs
56 FlsWrite
57 TcpSeqFaultCntMax
58 PktpsAvg
59 L4ProtoUDP
60 TcpPSeqCntAvg
61 TcpWnSzChgDiCnMax
62 TcpPAckCntAvg
63 Changes
64 L4ProtoICMP
65 AvgIATAvg
66 AvgIATMedian
67 TerminatedPrcs
68 ProcessesChgs
69 CreatedPrcs
70 DHCPV6
71 DHCP
72 StdIATStd
73 FlsDelete
74 HTTP
75 MaxPktSizeMax
76 TcpWnSzChDiCnAvg
77 TcpSeqSntBytesMax
78 PktAsmAvg
79 PktAsmMin
80 BytpsMax
81 BytAsmMin
82 TcpSeqSntBytesAvg
83 TcpWinSzUpCntAvg
84 TcpSeqFaultCntAvg
85 TcpWnSzDwCnAvg
86 DurationMax
87 TcpAveWinSzMedian
88 DelValueKeyChgs
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9.2.3 RQ3: Training Sets with Different Sizes
To address RQ3, we explored how much data must be set aside for training in order
to attain acceptable detection results. For this part of our study, we restricted
the experiments to the best performing learners J48 and PART, using all features.
Table 9.4 shows the performance of J48 and PART using training sets with different
sizes (i.e., 90%, 75%, 50%, and 25% of the data).
Table 9.4: J48 and PART performance on training sets with different sizes
Learner Performance Metrics % of data used for training
90% 75% 50% 25%
J48
Accuracy 96.11% 94.74% 92.56% 92.13%
Precision 95.94% 94.91% 93.82% 91.25%
Recall 98.67% 97.82% 95.88% 90.15%
FPR 10.00% 12.61% 15.36% 10.23%
F-score 97.28% 96.32% 94.80% 90.63%
G-score 94.13% 92.26% 89.69% 89.43%
PART
Accuracy 96.03% 94.15% 92.74% 91.90%
Precision 96.72% 94.35% 93.98% 91.85%
Recall 97.70% 97.58% 95.88% 89.55%
FPR 8.00% 14.06% 14.78% 9.93%
F-score 97.20% 95.92% 94.90% 90.60%
G-score 94.75% 91.33% 90.15% 89.20%
The results showed that the learners were able to produce similar performance
with 75% of the data used for training as in the case when 90% of data were used
for training, which is the commonly used 10-fold cross validation machine learning
approach. The performance of the learners was more significantly affected when
50% of the data were used for training, with less than 3% degradation of the F-
score and 5% degradation of the G-score compared to when 90% of the data were
used for training.
Even when only 25% of the data were used for training the malware detection
performance was still satisfactory, with Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F-score, and
G-score all around or above 90% and less than 7% degradation of the F-score and
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6% degradation of the G-score compared to when 90% of the data were used for
training. It should be noted that the FPR was significantly more affected by the
smaller sizes of the training set than any other performance metric.
It appears that the amount of data used for training is a trade-off between
somewhat better results at an expense of significantly more effort invested in la-
beling more data. The fact that smaller training sizes led to successful malware
detection is an important result of our study, with a significant practical value
because the manual labeling of the training set is a tedious and time consuming
process. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, none of related works have
experimented with different sizes of training sets.
9.3 Summary of Findings
The main findings of the work presented in this Chapter are as follows: (1) Adding
network flows-based features improved significantly the performance of malware
detection. (2) J48 and PART were the best performing learners, with the highest
F-score and G-score values. (3) Using J48, the first five features ranked by in-
formation gain attained the same performance as when using the all 88 features,
while in the case of PART the first fourteen features ranked by information led
to same performance as when the all 88 features were used. None of the system
logs-based features were included in these two models. (4) The classification per-
formance when training on 75% of the data was comparable to training on 90% of
the data. Using as little as 25% of the data for training led to somewhat worse,
but still very good classification performance, with Accuracy, Precision, Recall,
F-score, and G-score all around or above 90% and less than 7% degradation of the
F-score and and 6% degradation of the G-score compared to when 90% of the data
were used for training.
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Chapter 10
Malware Detection Using All
Modalities
In Chapters 8 and 9 we evaluated the performance of malware detection using
power consumption with network traffic data and network traffic data with sys-
tem logs, respectively. In this Chapter we are using four modalities, that is, all
the extracted features. Specifically, in this Chapter we present a multimodal deep
learning neural network that integrates different modalities (i.e., power consump-
tion, system logs, network traffic, and code-based static data) at decision level for
malware detection. We evaluate the performance of malware detection for each of
the modalities, and when using both feature level and decision level fusion.
10.1 Background on Artificial Neural Network
An artificial neural network (ANN) is an information processing system which
is inspired by the models of biological neural networks [272]. The basic unit of
computation in a neural network is the neuron, often called a node or unit. A
neural network consists of an input layer, one or more hidden layers, and an output
layer. The input layer receives various forms of information from the outside world
that the network will attempt to learn about, recognize, or otherwise process. The
goal of the hidden layer is to transform the inputs into something that the output
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layer can use, while the output layer signals how the model responds to the learned
information.
Artificial neural networks are widely used in many areas because of its capacity
of nonlinear mapping, high accuracy for learning, and good robustness [268]. Six
commonly used artificial neural networks in machine learning are: feed forward
neural network [145], radial basis function (RBF) neural network [224], Kohonen
self organizing neural network [188], recurrent neural network (RNN) [153], con-
volutional neural network (CNN) [153], and modular neural network [76]. From
these types of ANN, we implemented a deep feed forward neural network.
A deep feed forward neural network (also called feed forward network or multi-
layer perceptron) is an artificial neural network in which the connections between
the nodes do not form a cycle. In this network the information moves in one direc-
tion, forward, starting from the input nodes and moving onward the hidden layers
and output layer [139]. The goal of a feed forward neural network is to approximate
some function f ∗. For example, for a classifier, y = f ∗(x) maps an input x to a cat-
egory y. A feed forward neural network defines a mapping y = f(x; θ) and learns
the value of the parameters θ that result in the best function approximation [196].
Feed forward neural networks are called networks because they are typically
represented by composing together many distinct functions. For example let us
assume we have three functions (f (1), f (2), and f (3)) connected in a chain to form
f(x) = f (3)(f (2)(f (1)(x))). These chain structures are the most commonly used
structure for neural networks, in this case f (1) is the first layer of the network, f (2)
is the second layer, and so on. The overall length of the chain provide us with an
idea of the depth of the model. During the training process, the idea is to lead
f(x) to match f ∗(x). The training data provides us with approximate examples of
f ∗(x) evaluated at different training points. Each example x is followed by a label
y ≈ f ∗(x). Since the training data does not show the desired output for these
layers, they are called hidden layers. The last layer of the feed forward neural
network is the output layer. Using hidden layers require the usage of activation
functions. The activation function of a neuron defines the output of that neuron
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given an input or set of inputs. This output is then used as input for the next
neuron and so on, until a desired solution to the original problem is found [54].
This function maps the resulting values into the desired range, such as between 0
to 1.
The process in which a feed forward neural networks learns is called back-
propagation (also known as BackProp). BackProp is a supervised training scheme,
which means it learns from labeled training data. The learning process in deep
neural networks is achievable through the usage of optimization algorithms. The
objective of optimization algorithms is to search for a parameter vector w∗, in
which the loss function f takes a minimum value. A loss function is a measure of
how good a prediction model does in terms of being able to predict the expected
result. It uses two parameters: bias and weights. The bias are constants attached
to neurons and added to the weights input before the activation function is applied,
while the weights represents the strength of the connection between the neurons.
For example, if the weight from neuron a to b has greater magnitude, it means
that neuron a has greater influence over neuron b. In other words, weights decide
how much influence the input will have on the output.
Optimization is done through the calculation of gradients. A gradient mea-
sures how much the output of a function changes after modifying the inputs grad-
ually [55]. After computing the gradients, the optimization algorithm goes back
to adjust the weights and biases in the input and hidden layers to reduce the er-
ror. This process is repeated until the difference between the desired and expected
output is below some threshold value.
10.2 Background on Multimodal Learning
10.2.1 What is Multimodal Learning?
Multimodal learning involves relating information from multiple sources [221].
Each of these sources is known as a modality [79]. The objective of multimodal
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learning is to build models that can process and relate information from multiple
modalities. However, the research field of multimodal learning brings some unique
challenges given the heterogeneity of the data.
Baltrusˇaitis et al. [79] identified and explored five challenges related to mul-
timodal learning: (1) representation; (2) translation; (3) alignment; (4) fusion;
and (5) co-learning. Representation refers to how represent and summarize multi-
modal data in a way that exploits the complementarity and redundancy of multiple
modalities. Translation answers how to map data from one modality to another.
Alignment is to identify the direct relations between sub-elements from two or
more different modalities. Fusion refers to combine information from two or more
modalities to perform a prediction. Co-learning explores how knowledge learning
from one modality can help a computational model trained on a different modality.
From these multimodal challenges, in this dissertation we explore multimodal
fusion for malware detection.
10.2.2 Multimodal Fusion
Multimodal data fusion is the process of integrating information from multiple
modalities with the goal of predicting an outcome (e.g., malware versus non-
malicious software) through classification or regression [79, 74]. The interest in
multimodal fusion arises due to several advantages: (1) Having access to multiple
modalities that observe the same event may allow robust predictions and might
also allows us to capture complementary information; (2) A multimodal approach
can still operate when one of the modalities is missing or has been compromised
(e.g., an attacker modifies a modality). Next, we describe two multimodal fusion
levels: feature level and decision level fusion.
10.2.3 Levels of Multimodal Fusion
There exists two levels of multimodal fusion: feature level and decision level. Fea-
ture level (also known as early fusion) is the most widely used approach as it fuses
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all the extracted features into one feature vector. Feature level fusion is accom-
plished by simply combining the feature sets from different modalities. Let us
suppose that X = {x1, x2, x3, ..., xn} and Y = {y1, y2, y3, ..., yn} are feature vectors
(X ∈ Rm and Y ∈ Rm) representing the information extracted from two different
modalities. The objective is to combine these two feature sets in order to obtain a
new feature vector Z that would be used for classification. An advantage of feature
level fusion is that it uses the correlation between multiple features from different
modalities at an early stage, which helps to perform tasks better. However, when
doing feature level fusion is hard to represent the time synchronization between
the multimodal features [296]. To avoid this issue, features should be represented
in the same format before performing the fusion.
Decision level fusion (also known as late fusion) fuses multiple modalities in the
semantic space [74]. Here, decisions are combined using a decision fusion unit to
make a fused decision vector that is analyzed further to obtain a final decision D
about the task or hypothesis. Unlike feature level fusion, the decisions usually have
the same format representation. Furthermore, decision level fusion offers scalability
in terms of the modalities used during the fusion process, which is difficult to
achieve in the feature level fusion [75]. Another advantage of decision level fusion,
is that it allows us to use the most suitable methods for analyzing each modality.
However, a disadvantage of decision level fusion is that as different learners are
used to obtain the local decisions, the learning process for them becomes time
consuming. Besides feature level and decision level fusion, some prior works have
also used a hybrid approach by performing fusion on both feature level and decision
level. The idea behind the hybrid fusion approach is to use the advantages of both
early and late fusion strategies. Some prior works that used hybrid fusion focused
on multimedia analysis [85, 223, 298].
The fusion of multiple modalities provides complementary information and it is
recognized by prior works in multimedia analysis [74] and pattern recognition [79]
to increase the classification performance. We used the findings from previous mul-
timodal approaches on multimedia analysis and pattern recognition as motivation
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to explore the effectiveness of multimodal data fusion for malware detection.
10.2.4 Data Fusion Techniques
Some previous works have categorized distinct multimodal data fusion tech-
niques [79, 127, 74]. Baltrusˇaitis et al. [79] divided the multimodal fusion
techniques into two categories: model-agnostic approaches and model-based ap-
proaches. Model agnostic approaches include fusion techniques, such as averag-
ing, voting schemes, weighting-based, or a learned model; while model-based ap-
proaches include fusion techniques like kernel-based methods, graphical models,
and neural networks.
Durrant-Whyte et al. [127] described some probabilistic methods that are com-
monly employed for data fusion in robotics. Most of these methods were based
on the Bayes rule for combining prior and observation information. Typically, the
Bayes rule can be implemented by using the Kalman and extended Kalman filters
through sequential Monte Carlo methods or through the use of functional density
estimates. However, there are several limitations when using probabilistic tech-
niques: (1) complexity; (2) inconsistency; and (3) precision of models. To address
these limitations in multimodal data fusion, they recommended using techniques
like interval calculus, fuzzy logic and/or Dempster-Shafer methods.
Atrey et al. [74] presented three categories for multimodal data fusion tech-
niques: rule-based methods, classification-based methods, and estimation-based
methods. Rule-based fusion methods includes a variety of statistical rule-based
methods like linear weighted fusion and majority voting. Linear weighted fusion is
one of the simplest and widely used method, in which the information is combined
in a linear fashion. Some previous works used the linear fusion strategy at the
feature level (i.e., for video surveillance and traffic monitoring [175, 288]) and deci-
sion level (i.e., for speaker recognition and speech event detection [100]) to perform
multimedia analysis tasks. In the case of majority voting, the final decision is the
one where the majority of the learners reach a similar decision [228]. Some fusion
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methods under the classification-based category are the support vector machine,
Bayesian inference, Dempster Shafer theory, dynamic Bayesian networks, neural
networks, and the maximum entropy model. While the estimation category in-
cludes fusion techniques, such as the Kalman filter, extended Kalman filter, and
particle filter fusion methods.
From these data fusion techniques, we decided to used a deep neural network
because they are a commonly used in the multimodal domain. For instance, mul-
timodal neural networks have been explored for multimedia analysis tasks [142].
10.3 Malware Detection Using Deep Neural Net-
work with Decision Level Fusion
10.3.1 Approach & Contributions
Only a few works on malware detection used multimodal fusion [193, 184]. How-
ever, these works monitored mobile devices and none of them compared the per-
formance of feature level with decision level fusion, which is explored in this dis-
sertation. In this Section we present a multimodal deep learning neural network
that integrates different modalities (i.e., power consumption, network traffic data,
system logs, and code-based static data). We evaluated the performance of each
modality individually, when doing feature level fusion, and when doing decision
level fusion.
To construct a multimodal representation using neural networks each modal-
ity starts with several individual neural layers followed by a hidden layer that
projects the modalities into a joint space [71, 217, 225, 297]. The joint multimodal
representation is then passed through multiple hidden layers [79].
Our multimodal deep learning method is a feed forward network and was im-
plemented using Keras [58]. Each modality is inputted individually to the initial
networks, which are not connected to each other. The last layers of these networks
are connected to the merging layer. The merging layer, which is the first layer
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of the final network, concatenates the last hidden layers of the initial networks
and outputs the classification results. Figure 10.1 shows the deep neural network
architecture for decision level fusion.
Each modality on the initial network consists of an input layer and two hidden
layers. The number of used neurons (nodes) for the input layer varies per modality,
in particular the static data uses 48 neurons, the power consumption uses 132
neurons, the system logs 10 neurons, and the network traffic data 203 neurons,
which it is equal to the number of features extracted for each modality. Note that
the number of neurons comprising the input layer must be equal to the number of
features in the data [57].
Figure 10.1: Deep neural network architecture for decision level fusion
While ReLU is the most used activation function [196], it has the problem
that turns all negative numbers to zeros, which decreases the ability of the model
to fit or train the data properly. To avoid this problem we used the exponential
linear unit function (ELU) [109] as activation function. Unlike ReLU, ELU al-
lows negative values to push mean unit activations closer to zero speeding up the
learning. Furthermore, to avoid overfitting in our multimodal approach we used
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dropout regularization [278]. Dropout is a technique that helps to prevent overfit-
ting and provides a way of approximately combining exponentially many different
neural network architectures efficiently [278]. For our multimodal fusion approach
we used a dropout rate of 0.20. This rate is commonly used among deep neural
network-based models to prevent overfitting [141].
The structure of the final network is similar to the initial network. It consists
of the merging layer (which is the input layer of the final network), two hidden
layers, and the output layer which produces the classification results (i.e., classify
between malware and non-malicious software). The classification is done using
the Sigmoid activation function [151] and the Adam optimization algorithm [185]
with 100 epochs, a batch size of 25, and a learning rate of 0.001. The reason
why the Sigmoid activation function was chosen is because we are solving a two-
class problem and the output for this function ranges between 0 and 1. In the
case of the optimization algorithm, Adam was chosen because it is an extension of
the stochastic gradient descent, which has been popular among prior works [248].
Furthermore, Adam combines the advantages of two other extensions of stochastic
gradient descent: Adaptive Gradient Algorithm (AdaGrad) and Root Mean Square
Propagation (RMSProp) [185]. We used the default Keras parameters for the
Adam optimization algorithm which are: α (learning rate) = 0.001, β1 =0.9, and
β2 =0.999. The learning rate refers to the proportion in which the weights are
updated, β1 is the exponential decay rate for the first moment estimates, and β2
is the exponential decay rate for the second moment estimates. In addition, using
a batch size of 25 with epochs equal to 100 is a common practice among smaller
datasets [56].
To evaluate the performance of our multimodal approach we conducted sev-
eral experiments. We evaluated the performance of each modality individually,
when doing feature level fusion, and when doing decision level fusion. We com-
pared its performance to standard supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e.,
Random Forest, J48, JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO). For these six learners
we used the implementation provided in Weka [150]. For the malware detection
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experiments, we used five-fold cross validation, which consists of using four folds
of the labeled malware and non-malicious software instances for training (i.e., 80%
of the data) and the fifth fold of unseen malware and non-malicious instances for
testing. In the case of our deep learning neural network we also used five fold
cross validation, but we used 10% of the data for the validation set, 70% of the
data for training, and the remaining 20% of the data for testing. The validation
set provides an unbiased evaluation of a model fit on the training dataset while
tuning the model’s hyperparameters (e.g., the number of hidden units in a neural
network) [243]. We used the validation set as well as the training set to tune the
neural network model. While the training set is used to fit the model, the classifi-
cation accuracy using the validation set is also measured together. It is important
to emphasize that the validation set does not update the weights and the biases
of the model, but by monitoring the trends of the accuracies of both the training
set and the validation set, we can verify whether the model fitting was done cor-
rectly by avoiding the overffiting problem. We used the same performance metrics
described in Chapter 7.
Specifically, we explore the following research questions:
RQ1: Is each modality a good malware predictor when it is used individually?
RQ2: Does the malware detection performance improve when using multimodal
feature level fusion?
RQ3: Does multimodal decision level fusion performs better than using multimodal
feature level fusion?
The contributions of the research work presented in this Chapter are as follow:
• Collecting data from different sources allows us to develop a multimodal ap-
proach to malware detection, which has not been widely explored by the
prior works. Exceptions are [193, 184]. Kumar et al. [193] used two modal-
ities and Kim et al. [184] used only code-based static features, while we are
combining behavioral-based with code-based static features. Both of the
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prior works [193, 184] monitored mobile devices, while here we monitored a
general-purpose computer. None of these works compared the performance of
feature level with decision level fusion, which is explored in this dissertation.
• We proposed a multimodal decision level fusion malware detection approach
using a deep neural network. We compared its performance with the per-
formance of feature level fusion approaches based on deep neural network
and standard supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e., Random Forest,
J48, JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO). Kim et al. [184] used only code-
based static features, while we are combining dynamic behavioral-based with
code-based static features.
10.4 Results
10.4.1 RQ1: Results Using Each Modality Individually
Each modality was evaluated using our deep learning neural network and six stan-
dard supervised machine learning algorithms (i.e., Random Forest, J48, JRip,
PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO). For the feature level fusion and for each modality,
our deep neural network consisted of the input layer, two hidden layers and the out-
put layer. We used ELU as activation function for the hidden layers, the Sigmoid
activation function for the output layer, and the Adam optimization algorithm with
100 epochs, a batch size of 25, and a learning rate of 0.001. Figures 10.2, 10.3, 10.4,
and 10.5 show the box plots of the learners performance for each modality individ-
ually (i.e., power consumption, network traffic, system logs, and code-based static
data, respectively). Because low FPR indicates better performance, 1 − FPR is
shown in these Figures. The range of performance metrics for all these Figures
is from 0.0 to 1.0. Values of all metrics are in the interval [0, 1]. Ideally, a good
classifier would have Accuracy, Recall, Precision, 1 − FPR, F-score, and G-score
of 1.
In addition to box plots we also used the basic statistics (i.e, mean, me-
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dian, variance, and interquartile range (IQR)) based on the F-scores (given in
Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4) for each modality individually. Note that IQR is
a measure of statistical dispersion, being equal to the difference between 75th and
25th percentiles. Note that in Tables 10.1, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4, highest values
are inside a box and lowest values are shown in bold.
Table 10.1: Mean learners performance for each modality individually
Modality Learners Performance Metrics
Accuracy Recall Precision 1-FPR G-score F-score
P
o
w
e
r
c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n RF 0.968 0.994 0.962 0.909 0.950 0.978
J48 0.953 0.971 0.962 0.912 0.940 0.966
JRip 0.961 0.982 0.963 0.912 0.946 0.973
PART 0.950 0.968 0.961 0.909 0.938 0.964
NB 0.911 0.942 0.931 0.838 0.887 0.936
SMO 0.932 1.00 0.911 0.773 0.872 0.953
Deep NN 0.934 0.970 0.936 0.857 0.910 0.952
N
e
tw
o
rk
tr
a
ffi
c
RF 0.919 0.990 0.904 0.755 0.856 0.945
J48 0.944 0.964 0.957 0.898 0.930 0.960
JRip 0.937 0.971 0.941 0.859 0.911 0.956
PART 0.935 0.959 0.949 0.879 0.917 0.954
NB 0.715 0.918 0.738 0.244 0.385 0.818
SMO 0.898 0.966 0.896 0.741 0.839 0.930
Deep NN 0.791 0.887 0.822 0.586 0.701 0.853
S
y
st
e
m
lo
g
s
RF 0.756 0.890 0.788 0.445 0.593 0.836
J48 0.771 0.961 0.769 0.330 0.491 0.854
JRip 0.747 0.940 0.757 0.300 0.453 0.838
PART 0.699 1.00 0.674 0.189 0.312 0.805
NB 0.541 0.429 0.832 0.798 0.558 0.566
SMO 0.726 1.00 0.718 0.091 0.167 0.836
Deep NN 0.805 0.993 0.781 0.400 0.559 0.874
C
o
d
e
-b
a
se
d
S
ta
ti
c
RF 0.728 1.00 0.720 0.098 0.179 0.837
J48 0.706 0.996 0.705 0.033 0.064 0.826
JRip 0.719 0.948 0.730 0.188 0.311 0.825
PART 0.711 0.992 0.710 0.061 0.113 0.828
NB 0.727 0.948 0.737 0.217 0.352 0.829
SMO 0.738 0.980 0.734 0.177 0.300 0.839
Deep NN 0.655 0.937 0.679 0.050 0.093 0.787
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Figure 10.2: Box plots of the learners performance metrics for the power-based
features
Results in Figure 10.2 show that Random Forest provides better performance
than the other learners with respect to most of the performance metrics, except
for 1−FPR (with mean G-score of 0.950 and mean F-score of 0.978), followed by
JRip (with mean G-score of 0.946 and mean F-score of 0.973) and the deep learning
neural network (with mean G-score of 0.910 and mean F-score of 0.952). Lowest
FPR was achieved by J48 and JRip (both with mean FPR of 0.088), followed by
Random Forest and PART (both with mean FPR of 0.091). Random Forest and
JRip had highest G-score and F-score because both Recall were highest (with mean
Recall of 0.994 vs. 0.982), while both learners had similar mean Precision values
(0.962 vs. 0.963). Naive Bayes and SMO performed significantly worse than the
other learners. G-score for Naive Bayes was affected due to higher FPR (mean
FPR of 0.162), while F-score (mean F-score of 0.936) was fairly high because of
both Recall (mean Recall of 0.942) and Precision (mean Precision of 0.931). With
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respect to SMO, we concluded that our results are unreliable because for each
repetition in the 5-folds, the results were the same for all performance metrics.
Figure 10.3: Box plots of the learners performance metrics for the network traffic-
based features
Results in Figure 10.3 show that lowest FPR was achieved by both J48 and
JRip (both with mean FPR of 0.088), followed by Random Forest and PART (both
with mean FPR of 0.091). Random Forest and JRip had highest G-score and F-
score because both Recall were highest (with mean Recall of 0.994 vs. 0.982), while
both learners had similar mean Precision values (0.962 vs. 0.963). Naive Bayes
and SMO performed significantly worse than the other learners. G-score for Naive
Bayes was affected due to higher FPR (mean FPR of 0.162), while F-score (mean
F-score of 0.936) was fairly high because of both Recall (mean Recall of 0.942) and
Precision (mean Precision of 0.931).
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Figure 10.4: Box plots of the learners performance metrics for the system logs-
based features
In comparison to power-based and network traffic-based features, system logs-
based features did not provide a good performance on their own (see Figure 10.4).
However, when comparing the learners performance the deep learning neural net-
work was the best with mean G-score of 0.559 and mean F-score of 0.874. Worse
performance was attained for SMO (with mean G-score of 0.167 and mean F-score
of 0.836), Naive Bayes (with mean G-score of 0.558 and mean F-score of 0.566),
and PART (with mean G-score of 0.312 and mean F-score of 0.805). The perfor-
mance of SMO was affected by the high FPR (mean FPR of 0.909), while Naive
Bayes had lowest Recall (mean Recall of 0.449), and PART was affected due to a
lowest Precision (mean Precision of 0.674).
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Figure 10.5: Box plots of the learners performance metrics for the code-based static
features
As seen in Figure 10.5, the code-based static features did not perform well
on their own. While J48 had fairly high F-score, its G-score was lowest among
all learners (mean G-score of 0.064). Highest F-score was achieved with Random
Forest (mean F-score of 0.837), while the lowest F-score was attained by the deep
learning neural network (mean F-score of 0.787). The performance of J48 and the
deep learning neural network were affected mostly because of a higher FPR (mean
FPR of 0.967 and 0.950) and a lower Precision (mean Precision of 0.705 and 0.679,
respectively).
Using different performance metrics is of great importance because it reflects
the quality of malware detection. For instance, in Figure 10.5 the Recall is very
good (close to 1), and Precision fairly good (higher than 0.70) for all learners,
which lead to good F-score. However, the FPR is bad, which led to a bad G-score.
With respect to RQ1 (Is each modality a good malware predictor when it is
used individually?), we conclude that power-based features did very good on their
own, followed by network traffic-based features. System logs-based and code-based
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static features had lowest performance when evaluated individually. Specifically,
the statistical means in Table 10.1 shows that Random Forest was the best learner
with respect to Recall, F-score and G-score. In the case of the network traffic-
based features, J48 (in terms of F-score and G-score) and Random Forest (in
terms of Recall) were the best learners. When using system logs-based features
and code-based static features, the performance was significantly worse for all
learners. Furthermore, the performance of the deep neural network was worse
when using power-based, network traffic-based, and code-based static features,
that is, it had significantly lowest mean Precision, Recall, F-score, and G-score.
Additional basic statistics with respect to F-score for each of the modalities can
be found in Appendix B.
10.4.2 RQ2: Results for Multimodal Feature Level Fusion
To evaluate the feature level fusion, we combined all features into one feature vector
for all learners. In the case of decision level fusion, all modalities were evaluated
individually and their results were fused before making the classification. See
Figure 10.6 for the learners performance of both feature level and decision level
fusion. The range of performance metrics for Figure 10.6 is from 0.50 to 1.0.
In addition to box plots, we also used Table 10.2 to evaluate the mean learners
performance for feature level and decision level fusion. Note that in Table 10.2,
the results for the standard supervised algorithms are for feature level fusion, Deep
NN-FL refers to the deep neural network for feature level fusion, and Deep NN-DL
is the deep neural network for decision level fusion.
We used Figure 10.6 and Table 10.2 to answer RQ2 (Does the malware detection
performance improve when using multimodal feature level fusion?) and RQ3 (Does
multimodal decision level fusion performs better than using multimodal feature
level fusion?).
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Figure 10.6: Box plots of the learners performance when doing feature level fusion
Table 10.2: Mean learners performance for feature level and decision level fusion
Learners Performance Metrics
Accuracy Recall Precision 1-FPR G-score F-score
RF-FL 0.967 1.00 0.955 0.889 0.941 0.977
J48-FL 0.967 0.982 0.971 0.932 0.956 0.976
JRip-FL 0.958 0.978 0.963 0.912 0.944 0.970
PART-FL 0.958 0.975 0.966 0.920 0.946 0.970
NB-FL 0.942 0.942 0.974 0.941 0.942 0.958
SMO-FL 0.963 0.986 0.963 0.912 0.947 0.974
Deep NN-FL 0.830 0.923 0.842 0.629 0.746 0.881
Deep NN-DL 0.970 0.963 0.993 0.986 0.974 0.978
When doing feature level fusion the best performance was obtained for J48 with
respect to G-score (mean G-score of 0.956), while the F-score values for both J48
and Random Forest were very close (mean F-score of 0.976 and 0.977, respectively).
The second best learners were PART and JRip (with mean G-scores of 0.946 and
0.944 and mean F-scores of 0.970 for both learners). The deep learning neural
network had the worst performance for feature level fusion, with respect to all
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metrics (mean G-score of 0.746 and mean F-score of 0.881). Its performance was
affected by relatively high FPR (with mean FPR of 0.371) and lowest Recall and
Precision (mean Recall of 0.923 and mean Precision of 0.842).
To answer RQ2 (Does the malware detection performance improve when using
multimodal feature level fusion?), the performance of all learners was compared
after we did feature level fusion. Results from Figure 10.6 and Table 10.2 showed
that feature level fusion improves the performance of the learners compared to
when each modality was evaluated individually, with the exception of the power-
based features, which did very good on its own. Note that the malware detection
based only on power-based features had the closest performance (See Table 10.1)
to the performance of the feature level fusion.
Interestingly, the deep learning neural network had the worse performance for
feature level fusion when compared to standard supervised algorithms. This be-
havior could be explained due to several reasons. First, deep neural networks are
proven to work best for bigger datasets [226, 266]. Also, most of the used su-
pervised algorithms are either tree-based or rule-based algorithms, which tend to
perform relatively well without considering the dataset size. Second, the deep neu-
ral network architecture for the feature level fusion has only the input layer, two
hidden layers, and the output layer. Hence, when compared to the architecture
for the decision level fusion it has two hidden layers less which might be affect-
ing the ability of the model to learn. Third, the performance of the deep neural
network could be affected when dealing with unbalanced data. While we do not
consider our data as unbalanced, this possibility is contemplated since we have 153
instances labeled as malware and 66 instances labeled as non-malicious. Meaning
we have twice the amount of malware instances when compared to the number of
non-malicious instances.
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10.4.3 RQ3: Results for Multimodal Decision Level Fusion
Here we are comparing the performance of the deep learning neural network feature
level fusion with the deep learning neural network decision level fusion. To address
RQ3 (Does multimodal decision level fusion performs better than using multimodal
feature level fusion?) we used Figure 10.6 and Tables 10.2.
The performance of the deep learning neural network decision level fusion works
best when compared to the deep learning neural network fusion level for all per-
formance metrics. We believe the behavior of the feature level fusion in the deep
neural network is due to the size of our dataset. While we are using the same
dataset, multimodal decision level fusion offers scalability in terms of the modal-
ities used in the fusion process, which is difficult to achieve in the feature level
fusion [74, 75].
When the deep learning neural network decision level fusion was compared with
the feature level fusion of standard supervised algorithms, the deep learning neural
network decision level fusion works best for most of the performance metrics, with
the exception of Recall and F-score (see Tables 10.2). In the case of Recall, both
Random Forest and J48 feature level fusion had highest values in comparison to
deep learning neural network decision level fusion, which justifies why their mean
F-scores were very close to the deep learning neural network decision level fusion.
While Recall for the deep learning neural network decision level fusion was not
among the highest, its mean F-score was similar to the mean F-scores of both
Random Forest and J48 feature level fusion due to higher Precision.
10.5 Summary of Findings
The main findings of the work presented in this Chapter are as follows:
• From the four evaluated modalities, malware detection based on power con-
sumption was the only one that performed well on its own, that is, power-
based features are good as malware predictors.
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• Some of the learners (e.g., J48) did well for network traffic-based features.
• When using system logs-based or code-based static features, the performance
of malware detection was significantly worse for all learners.
• When doing feature level fusion, the performance of Random Forest, J48,
JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO was better when compared to the deep
neural network feature level fusion. In terms of F-score, the best performance
for feature level fusion was attained by Random Forest.
• When compared to Random Forest, J48, JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and
SMO, the multimodal decision level fusion for the deep neural network works
best for most of the performance metrics, with the exception of Recall and
F-score.
• The performance of the deep learning neural network decision level fusion
works better when compared to the deep learning neural network feature
level fusion.
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Chapter 11
Threats to Validity
While we took the necessary precautions to prevent threats to validity, these
cannot be avoid completely. A threat to the construct validity is the fact that
power consumption may vary depending on what type of application is used. For
example, there are applications that affect a particular component (e.g., CPU or
memory) of the general-purpose computer. To address this issue, we used different
types of malware and non-malicious applications.
Another threat to construct of validity with respect to our experimental set-
up is that we did not consider evaluating different sampling rates on the hardware
configuration when collecting the power consumption data. Nevertheless, the work
by [121] stated that a high sampling rate is not always necessary to understand
the behavior of the power consumption during the execution of an application soft-
ware. Furthermore, to prevent construct factors, different hardware configurations
were evaluated during the testbed design and development. Evaluating different
hardware configurations is of great importance because each configurations may
yield different results.
An internal threat to validity is with respect to the number of malware examples
that belong to a specific malware type (e.g., trojans, viruses, rootkit, ransomware).
Since we used a small representation of each malware type, their behavior may
not be representative enough to conclude that all malware types will behave the
same way. Furthermore, we also took into consideration the fact that Windows
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OS executes actions in the background that could increase the false positive rate
when using only power-based features. Thus, to prevent an internal threat to
validity we integrated the power-based features with other types of behavioral-
based features (network traffic-based and system logs-based features) and code-
based static features.
With respect to the conclusion validity we used multiple performance met-
rics, because doing so helps to reflect different aspects of the quality of malware
detection.
A threat to external validity is that while our dataset is largest in comparison
to prior works that have used power-based features, it is still small when compared
to other works that have done malware detection. For the external validity, it is
important to mention that machine learning algorithms may perform differently
on different datasets, and when different features are used.
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Chapter 12
Conclusions & Future Work
Although malware detection is a very active area of research, few works were
focused on using physical properties, such as power consumption. In this disserta-
tion we presented a malware detection approach based on using dynamic features
extracted from the power consumption, network traffic data and system logs, which
were collected while running malware samples and non-malicious software applica-
tions on our experimental testbed. In addition, we also collected code-based static
features. We used the extracted features for multimodal malware detection, using
both feature level fusion and decision level fusion. Specifically, our malware de-
tection approaches are based on: (1) feature level fusion using power consumption
and network traffic data; (2) feature level fusion using network traffic data (i.e.,
commonly used network traffic-based and network flow-based features) and system
logs; and (3) multimodal feature level and decision level fusion.
For the feature level fusion using power consumption and network traffic data,
we conducted several machine learning experiments for malware detection. Seven
power-based and eighteen network traffic-based features were extracted and ten
supervised machine learning algorithms were used for classification. The main
findings include: (1) Among the best performing learners, Random Forest had the
highest F-score and close to the highest G-score. (2) Power data extracted from the
+12V CPU rails led to better performance than power data from the other three
voltage rails. (3) Using only power-based features provided better performance
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than using only network traffic-based features; using both types of features had
the best performance. (4) Feature selection based on information gain was used
to identify the smallest numbers of features sufficient to successfully distinguish
malware from non-malicious software. The top eleven features provided the same
performance as using all 25 features. Five out of seven power-based features were
among the top eleven features.
For feature level fusion using network traffic data and system logs, the baseline
feature vector was created by combining the system logs-based features and the
commonly used network traffic-based features. Then, we added the network flows-
based features to the baseline feature vector to study their effect on the malware
detection. We evaluated the performance of four supervised machine learning algo-
rithms (i.e., J48, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, and PART) for malware detection
and identified the best learner. Furthermore, we used feature selection based on
information gain to identify the smallest number of features needed for classifica-
tion. In addition, we experimented with training sets of different sizes. The main
findings include: (1) Adding network flows-based features improved significantly
the performance of malware detection. (2) J48 and PART were the best perform-
ing learners, with the highest F-score and G-score values. (3) Using J48, the top
five features ranked by information gain attained the same performance as when
using all 88 features. In the case of PART, the top fourteen features ranked by
information gain led to the same performance as when all 88 features were used.
None of the system logs-based features were included in these two models. (4) The
classification performance when training on 75% of the data was comparable to
training on 90% of the data. As little as 25% of the data can be used for training at
an expense of somewhat higher, but not very significant performance degradation
(i.e., less than 7% for F-score and 6% for G-score compared to when 90% of the
data were used for training).
We also presented a multimodal deep learning neural network that integrates
different modalities (i.e., power consumption, system logs, network traffic, and
code-based static data). We evaluated the performance of each modality indi-
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vidually, when doing feature level fusion, and when doing decision level fusion.
We compared its performance to standard supervised machine learning algorithms
(i.e., Random Forest, J48, JRip, PART, Naive Bayes, and SMO). The main find-
ings for the multimodal approach include: (1) Power-based features did very well
on their own for all learners, while some of the learners did well for network traffic-
based features (e.g., J48), and system logs-based and code-based static features
performed significantly worse for all learners. (2) Deep neural network feature
level fusion performs worst compared to feature level fusion for standard super-
vised algorithms. (3) Deep neural network decision level fusion performs slightly
better compared to feature level fusion for standard supervised algorithms.
As part of our future work we would like to increase the sample size for the
experiments. Furthermore, instead of hand picking the features given to the mul-
timodal approach, we plan as future work to let the algorithm extract features
for both malware and non-malicious software to explore if doing so improves the
performance of the model. In addition, we would like to explore the performance
of malware detection per malware type and/or malware families and to evaluate
other methods for multimodal fusion.
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Appendix A
All features ranked using
information gain
Table A.1: All features ranked using information gain
Rank Feature
1 PwrMedian
2 PwrMean
3 PwrMinimum
4 PwrSkewness
5 BytesSntSum
6 PwrKurtosis
7 PktsLength
8 L4ProtoIGMP
9 PktsSentSum
10 BytesSntMax
11 PktSentMax
12 SSDP
13 AC Pwr 50 32
14 ARP
15 AC Pwr 50 30
Rank Feature
16 AC Pwr 5 48
17 NBNS
18 AC Pwr 50 47
19 AC Pwr 50 49
20 AC Pwr 50 50
21 UDP
22 BytesSntAvg
23 PwrVariance
24 AC Pwr 50 40
25 DurationAvg
26 AC Pwr 20 1
27 AC Pwr 50 1
28 AC Pwr 15 1
29 AC Pwr 25 1
30 AC Pwr 10 1
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Rank Feature
31 AC Pwr 5 1
32 IGMPV3
33 ICMPV6
34 PktsRcvdSum
35 TCP
36 AvgPktSzAvg
37 AC Pwr 50 43
38 PwrMaximum
39 BytesRcvdSum
40 PktSentAvg
41 PktAsmAvg
42 No bytes transferred
43 LLMNR
44 No of ICMP
45 UniqueSourceIP
46 FlowDirA
47 TcpAckFaultCntMax
48 AC Pwr 5 2
49 AC Pwr 20 2
50 AC Pwr 50 2
51 AC Pwr 15 2
52 AC Pwr 25 2
53 AC Pwr 10 2
54 AC Pwr 50 44
55 AC Pwr 25 4
56 AC Pwr 50 4
57 AC Pwr 10 4
58 AC Pwr 15 4
59 AC Pwr 5 4
60 AC Pwr 20 4
Rank Feature
61 Flows
62 BROWSER
63 TcpInitWinSzAvg
64 AC Pwr 50 34
65 AC Pwr 50 28
66 AC Pwr 25 19
67 AC Pwr 50 19
68 AC Pwr 20 19
69 TcpAckFaultCntAvg
70 AC Pwr 25 14
71 AC Pwr 20 14
72 AC Pwr 50 14
73 AC Pwr 15 14
74 TcpInitWinSzMax
75 AC Pwr 5 3
76 AC Pwr 20 3
77 AC Pwr 25 3
78 AC Pwr 15 3
79 AC Pwr 50 3
80 AC Pwr 10 3
81 AC Pwr 50 46
82 BytesSntMin
83 AC Pwr 50 35
84 AC Pwr 50 33
85 PktsRcvdMax
86 AC Pwr 50 31
87 AC Pwr 50 36
88 AC Pwr 10 6
89 AC Pwr 50 6
90 AC Pwr 20 6
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Rank Feature
91 AC Pwr 15 6
92 AC Pwr 25 6
93 BytAsmAvg
94 AC Pwr 15 7
95 AC Pwr 50 7
96 AC Pwr 10 7
97 AC Pwr 25 7
98 AC Pwr 20 7
99 BytpsAvg
100 AC Pwr 25 12
101 AC Pwr 20 12
102 AC Pwr 50 39
103 AC Pwr 15 12
104 AC Pwr 50 12
105 AvgPktSzMedian
106 FlowDirB
107 AC Pwr 50 9
108 AC Pwr 25 9
109 AC Pwr 10 9
110 AC Pwr 20 9
111 BytesRcvdMax
112 AC Pwr 15 9
113 AC Pwr 50 41
114 UniqueDestIP
115 BytesRcvdAvg
116 AC Pwr 50 10
117 AC Pwr 15 10
118 AC Pwr 10 10
119 AC Pwr 25 10
120 AC Pwr 20 10
Rank Feature
121 RegistryChgs
122 SetValueKeyChgs
123 StdPktSzStd
124 AC Pwr 50 18
125 AC Pwr 20 18
126 AC Pwr 25 18
127 AC Pwr 50 29
128 AC Pwr 50 42
129 TcpAveWinSzAvg
130 L4ProtoTCP
131 MinPktSizeMin
132 PktsRcvdAvg
133 AC Pwr 50 38
134 AC Pwr 20 13
135 AC Pwr 50 13
136 AC Pwr 25 13
137 AC Pwr 15 13
138 DNS
139 AC Pwr 50 5
140 AC Pwr 20 5
141 AC Pwr 5 5
142 AC Pwr 25 5
143 AC Pwr 15 5
144 AC Pwr 10 5
145 AC Pwr 10 8
146 AC Pwr 50 8
147 AC Pwr 50 27
148 AC Pwr 50 45
149 AC Pwr 15 8
150 AC Pwr 25 8
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Rank Feature
151 AC Pwr 20 8
152 TcpSeqFaultCntMax
153 AC Pwr 15 15
154 AC Pwr 25 15
155 AC Pwr 50 26
156 AC Pwr 20 15
157 AC Pwr 50 15
158 L4ProtoUDP
159 PktpsMax
160 AC Pwr 50 25
161 AC Pwr 50 20
162 TcpWinSzDwCnMax
163 AC Pwr 25 20
164 AC Ntwk 25 11
165 TcpPAckCntMax
166 AC Pwr 20 20
167 TcpPSeqCntMax
168 AC Pwr 25 25
169 AC Ntwk 20 11
170 AC Ntwk 50 11
171 AC Ntwk 15 11
172 AC Pwr 50 11
173 AC Pwr 20 17
174 AC Pwr 25 11
175 AC Ntwk 25 17
176 AC Pwr 20 11
177 AC Ntwk 50 17
178 AC Ntwk 20 17
179 AC Pwr 25 17
180 AC Pwr 15 11
Rank Feature
181 AC Pwr 50 17
182 PktpsAvg
183 AC Pwr 50 21
184 AC Pwr 25 21
185 Changes
186 FlsWrite
187 AC Pwr 50 37
188 FileChgs
189 L4ProtoICMP
190 TcpWiSzUpCntMax
191 ResourceTblSz
192 StackCommitSz
193 ImportTblSz
194 indexMin
195 Sections
196 TLSTblSz
197 oleaut32
198 comctl32
199 wininet
200 DelayImportDescriptors
201 urlmon
202 comdlg32
203 mpr
204 StackReserveSz
205 version
206 wintrust
207 winspool
208 IAT-TblSz
209 rasapi32
210 HeaderSz
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Rank Feature
211 DHCP
212 DHCPV6
213 indexMax
214 lz32
215 winmm
216 BaseOfCode
217 ImageSz
218 BaseOfData
219 imm32
220 msimg32
221 opengl32
222 HeapReserveSz
223 AC Pwr 25 23
224 kernel32
225 LoadConfigTblSz
226 advapi32
227 EntryPointAddr
228 Parameters
229 AC Pwr 50 16
230 AC Pwr 50 24
231 AC Pwr 50 23
232 AC Pwr 50 22
233 AC Pwr 25 24
234 RelocationTblSz
235 shell32
236 AC Pwr 25 22
237 AC Pwr 20 16
238 HeapCommitSz
239 glu32
240 DataDirectories
Rank Feature
241 ExportTblSz
242 user32
243 AC Pwr 25 16
244 gdi32
245 ole32
246 HTTP
247 AC Ntwk 50 45
248 InitializedDataSz
249 AC Ntwk 25 18
250 AC Ntwk 25 20
251 AC Ntwk 25 19
252 AC Ntwk 25 16
253 AC Ntwk 50 6
254 AC Ntwk 25 15
255 AC Ntwk 25 14
256 AC Ntwk 25 21
257 AC Ntwk 25 22
258 AC Ntwk 25 23
259 AC Ntwk 25 24
260 AC Ntwk 50 4
261 AC Ntwk 50 3
262 AC Ntwk 50 2
263 AC Ntwk 50 1
264 AC Ntwk 25 25
265 AC Ntwk 25 13
266 AC Ntwk 25 12
267 AC Ntwk 25 10
268 AC Ntwk 25 1
299 AC Ntwk 20 19
270 AC Ntwk 20 18
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Rank Feature
271 AC Ntwk 20 16
272 AC Ntwk 20 15
273 AC Ntwk 20 14
274 AC Ntwk 20 20
275 AC Ntwk 25 2
276 AC Ntwk 25 9
277 AC Ntwk 25 3
278 AC Ntwk 25 8
279 AC Ntwk 25 7
280 AC Ntwk 25 6
281 AC Ntwk 25 5
282 AC Ntwk 25 4
283 AC Ntwk 50 5
284 AC Ntwk 50 7
285 CodeSz
286 AC Ntwk 50 32
287 AC Ntwk 50 34
288 AC Ntwk 50 33
289 AC Ntwk 50 31
290 AC Ntwk 50 8
291 AC Ntwk 50 30
292 AC Ntwk 50 29
293 AC Ntwk 50 35
294 AC Ntwk 50 36
295 AC Ntwk 50 37
296 AC Ntwk 50 38
297 AC Ntwk 50 43
298 AC Ntwk 50 42
299 AC Ntwk 50 41
300 AC Ntwk 50 40
Rank Feature
301 AC Ntwk 50 39
302 AC Ntwk 50 28
303 AC Ntwk 50 27
304 AC Ntwk 50 26
305 AC Ntwk 50 16
306 AC Ntwk 50 14
307 AC Ntwk 50 13
308 AC Ntwk 50 12
309 AC Ntwk 50 10
310 AC Ntwk 50 9
311 AC Ntwk 50 15
312 AC Ntwk 50 18
313 AC Ntwk 50 25
314 AC Ntwk 50 19
315 AC Ntwk 50 24
316 AC Ntwk 50 23
317 AC Ntwk 50 22
318 AC Ntwk 50 21
319 AC Ntwk 50 20
320 AC Ntwk 20 13
321 AC Ntwk 20 12
322 AC Ntwk 20 10
323 TcpFlLAcRcBytAvg
324 TcpAveWinSzMedian
325 AC Ntwk 50 47
326 TcpFlLAcRcBytMax
327 AC Ntwk 20 9
328 TcpPAckCntAvg
329 TcpSeqFaultCntAvg
330 TcpWinSzDwCnAvg
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Rank Feature
331 TcpWinSzUpCntAvg
332 TcpWiSzChDiCnMax
333 TcpWinSzChDiCnAvg
334 AC Ntwk 5 1
335 StdIATStd
336 AvgIATMedian
337 AvgIATAvg
338 AC Ntwk 50 46
339 TcpSeqSntBytesAvg
340 TcpSeqSntBytesMax
341 TcpPSeqCntAvg
342 ProcessesChgs
343 CreatedPrcs
344 TerminatedPrcs
345 DurationMax
346 DelValueKeyChgs
347 Magic
348 FlsDelete
349 AC Ntwk 50 44
350 BytAsmMin
351 AC Ntwk 50 50
352 AC Ntwk 50 48
353 PktAsmMin
354 BytpsMax
355 AC Ntwk 50 49
356 MaxPktSizeMax
357 AC Ntwk 5 2
358 AC Ntwk 5 3
359 AC Ntwk 5 4
360 AC Ntwk 20 1
361 AC Ntwk 15 14
362 AC Ntwk 15 13
Rank Feature
363 AC Ntwk 15 12
364 AC Ntwk 15 10
365 AC Ntwk 15 9
366 AC Ntwk 15 15
367 AC Ntwk 20 2
368 AC Ntwk 15 7
369 AC Ntwk 20 3
370 AC Ntwk 20 8
371 AC Ntwk 20 7
372 AC Ntwk 20 6
373 AC Ntwk 20 5
374 AC Ntwk 20 4
375 AC Ntwk 15 8
376 AC Ntwk 15 6
377 AC Ntwk 5 5
378 AC Ntwk 10 7
379 AC Ntwk 10 5
380 AC Ntwk 10 4
381 AC Ntwk 10 3
382 AC Ntwk 10 2
383 AC Ntwk 10 1
384 AC Ntwk 10 6
385 AC Ntwk 10 8
386 AC Ntwk 15 5
387 AC Ntwk 10 9
388 AC Ntwk 15 4
389 AC Ntwk 15 3
390 AC Ntwk 15 2
391 AC Ntwk 15 1
392 AC Ntwk 10 10
393 indexAvg
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Appendix B
Basic Statistics of F-score for
each modality individually
This Appendix includes the basic statistics of F-score when using each modality
individually (i.e., power consumption, network traffic data, system logs, and code-
based static data). Note that the learners in bold are the ones who attained highest
performance for that particular modality.
Table B.1: Basics Statistics of F-score using power-based features
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
RF 0.978 0.978 1.503 · 10−5 0.006
J48 0.966 0.968 3.024 · 10−5 0.006
JRip 0.973 0.974 9.651 · 10−6 0.003
PART 0.964 0.964 3.333 · 10−5 0.003
NB 0.936 0.939 6.652 · 10−5 0.008
SMO 0.953 0.953 1.370 · 10−32 0.000
Deep NN 0.952 0.959 5.185 · 10−4 0.017
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Table B.2: Basics Statistics of F-score using network traffic-based features
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
RF 0.945 0.947 8.355 · 10−5 0.005
J48 0.960 0.961 9.854 · 10−5 0.008
JRip 0.956 0.960 7.825 · 10−5 0.013
PART 0.954 0.951 8.674 · 10−5 0.013
NB 0.818 0.821 1.882 · 10−4 0.009
SMO 0.930 0.937 1.525 · 10−4 0.018
Deep NN 0.853 0.862 4.690 · 10−4 0.035
Table B.3: Basics Statistics of F-score using system logs-based features
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
RF 0.836 0.835 7.318 · 10−5 0.010
J48 0.854 0.857 9.258 · 10−5 0.015
JRip 0.838 0.843 1.638 · 10−4 0.017
PART 0.805 0.805 2.924 · 10−4 0.027
NB 0.566 0.565 8.930 · 10−5 0.008
SMO 0.836 0.836 0.000 · 100 0.000
Deep NN 0.874 0.882 3.658 · 10−4 0.003
Table B.4: Basics Statistics of F-score using code-based static features
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
RF 0.837 0.836 4.965 · 10−6 0.002
J48 0.826 0.825 6.249 · 10−6 0.003
JRip 0.825 0.822 1.167 · 10−4 0.014
PART 0.828 0.828 1.791 · 10−5 0.005
NB 0.829 0.830 3.134 · 10−5 0.007
SMO 0.839 0.840 1.496 · 10−5 0.005
Deep NN 0.767 0.789 2.750 · 10−5 0.000
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Appendix C
Basic Statistics for feature level
and decision level fusion
This Appendix shows the basic statistics for all learners when all features
were combined in one feature vector (feature level fusion). Note that in Ta-
bles C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, and C.6, FL refers to feature level fusion, while DL
refers to decision level fusion.
Table C.1: Basics Statistics of Accuracy
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
Random Forest-FL 0.967 0.968 3.267 · 10−5 0.008
J48-FL 0.967 0.963 9.290 · 10−5 0.011
JRip-FL 0.958 0.957 3.151 · 10−5 0.008
PART-FL 0.958 0.961 9.174 · 10−5 0.011
Naive Bayes-FL 0.942 0.943 5.120 · 10−5 0.009
SMO-FL 0.963 0.963 9.267 · 10−5 0.015
Deep NN-FL 0.830 0.830 3.730 · 10−4 0.023
Deep NN-DL 0.970 0.977 1.205 · 10−4 0.017
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Table C.2: Basics Statistics of Recall
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
Random Forest-FL 1.00 1.00 0.000 · 100 0.000
J48-FL 0.982 0.980 5.506 · 10−5 0.007
JRip-FL 0.978 0.974 4.936 · 10−5 0.011
PART-FL 0.975 0.974 9.920 · 10−5 0.011
Naive Bayes-FL 0.942 0.941 8.354 · 10−5 0.015
SMO-FL 0.986 0.987 2.658 · 10−5 0.000
Deep NN-FL 0.923 0.933 5.062 · 10−4 0.000
Deep NN-DL 0.963 0.967 1.111 · 10−4 0.000
Table C.3: Basics Statistics of Precision
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
Random Forest-FL 0.955 0.956 5.488 · 10−5 0.010
J48-FL 0.971 0.968 9.02 · 10−5 0.011
JRip-FL 0.963 0.965 5.585 · 10−5 0.011
PART-FL 0.966 0.968 1.102 · 10−4 0.010
Naive Bayes-FL 0.974 0.976 7.00 · 10−5 0.013
SMO-FL 0.963 0.965 1.406 · 10−4 0.017
Deep NN-FL 0.842 0.848 3.838 · 10−4 0.025
Deep NN-DL 0.993 1.000 1.975 · 10−4 0.000
Table C.4: Basics Statistics of G-score
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
Random Forest-FL 0.941 0.944 1.148 · 10−4 0.015
J48-FL 0.956 0.953 1.792 · 10−4 0.015
JRip-FL 0.944 0.946 8.25 · 10−5 0.012
PART-FL 0.946 0.952 1.933 · 10−4 0.018
Naive Bayes-FL 0.942 0.940 8.798 · 10−5 0.009
SMO-FL 0.947 0.949 2.592 · 10−4 0.026
Deep NN-FL 0.746 0.761 1.407 · 10−3 0.052
Deep NN-DL 0.974 0.983 2.309 · 10−4 0.013
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Table C.5: Basic Statistics of F-score
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
Random Forest-FL 0.977 0.978 1.513 · 10−5 0.005
J48-FL 0.976 0.974 4.670 · 10−5 0.008
JRip-FL 0.970 0.969 1.567 · 10−4 0.005
PART-FL 0.970 0.972 4.61 · 10−5 0.008
Naive Bayes-FL 0.958 0.958 2.740 · 10−4 0.007
SMO-FL 0.974 0.974 4.475 · 10−5 0.010
Deep NN-FL 0.881 0.882 4.475 · 10−5 0.010
Deep NN-DL 0.978 0.983 6.570 · 10−5 0.012
Table C.6: Basics Statistics of FPR
Learners Mean Median Variance IQR
Random Forest-FL 0.111 0.106 3.597 · 10−4 0.027
J48-FL 0.068 0.076 5.229 · 10−4 0.027
JRip-FL 0.088 0.083 3.469 · 10−4 0.027
PART-FL 0.080 0.076 6.657 · 10−4 0.023
Naive Bayes-FL 0.059 0.053 3.801 · 10−4 0.030
SMO-FL 0.088 0.083 8.571 · 10−4 0.042
Deep NN-FL 0.371 0.357 3.175 · 10−3 0.071
Deep NN-DL 0.014 0.000 9.070 · 10−4 0.000
